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On a typical day, most of us engage in a considerable number of behaviours that could
be classified as ‘unethical’. At work, we might be tempted to tell our colleagues that
we are on schedule for that joint project, despite not having worked on it productively
for days. To the person soliciting donations for Greenpeace outside the neighbourhood
supermarket, we lie that we are already a member of their organization so that we will
be left alone. While doing our shopping we might purchase non-certified coffee, even
when we realize that the farmer growing the beans does not earn enough to make a
proper living. And what about stealing money or equipment from the workplace, mis-
representing sales figures, bribing medical staff to receive better health care or outright
violent behaviour towards others? While most us will never be involved in such larger
scandals, they are a frequent occurence in many parts of the world today. Addition-
ally, even more mundane forms of unethical behaviour can have notable repercussions if
followed by enough people.
Unethical behaviour has caught the attention of behavioural economists for two main
reasons. The first is that at the collective level these behaviours have large negative pay-
off consequences to another party or lead to a large redistribution of resources between
individuals or entities. For example, the Association of Certified Examiners estimates
that occupational fraud accounts for a loss of 5% of revenues, or $3.5 trillion dollars, at
the global level every single year (ACFE, 2012). The second reason for the interest in
unethical behaviour is that individuals do not seem to do enough of it. Until relatively
recently, the main framework used to understand behaviour such as stealing, lying and
bribery was that of Becker (1968)’s model of criminal behaviour. Individuals engage in
such behaviours if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs, which depend on the im-
posed punishment (eg. a fine or prison sentence) and the probability of getting caught.
For many situations in which unethical behaviour takes place, the benefits are consider-
able and the costs small or zero. Consider the decision to rob someone’s house. While
some individuals protect their houses with sophisticated security equipment, many of
us simply lock the front door and, if we have been unattentive, left a window open on
the first floor. It would be relatively trivial to enter the premise while the stakes (eg.
laptop computers, jewelry) are quite large. Furthermore, taking only a few items would
not warrant the time and effort of the police for a full scale investigation, making the
cost of robbery minimal.
Two main insights from behavioural economics contributed to understanding this puzzle.
First, many individuals exhibit social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Andreoni
and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002), meaning that they generally care for the
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welfare of others and thus may choose to forgo benefits so as not to impose costs on other
people. The second insight is that a substantial proportion of individuals are aversive
to engaging in unethical behaviour. Even in a setting with considerable stakes and no
probability of getting caught many individuals do not lie (Gneezy, 2005; Fischbacher
and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013; Abeler et al., 2012), steal (Belot and Schro¨der, 2013) or bribe
(Gneezy et al., 2013b).
The four chapters in this dissertation refine and apply insights from this literature
through the lens of mechanism design. The study of mechanism design has at its core
the design of economic institutions that achieve some predetermined behavioural out-
come, such as efficiency, revenue, profits, as well as cooperation or honesty. Incorporating
behavioural insights on unethical behaviour into the study of mechanism design is impor-
tant for several reasons. First, it is possible that the occurrence of unethical behaviour
changes the effectiveness of mechanisms that are considered optimal in a more abstract
environment (Chapters 1 and 2). Second, mechanism designers, such as employers and
policy makers, may consider ethical behaviour a desirable objective in itself. From this
perspective, it is important to consider the interaction between chosen incentives, such as
revenue-sharing and tournament schemes, and unethical behaviour (Chapter 3). Finally,
different mechanisms can be used to determine whether key behavioural assumptions,
such as social preferences, have predictive power in actual ethical behaviour (Chapter
4).
Controlled experiments are key in establishing causal relationships between economic
institutions and unethical behaviour. As such the chapters in this dissertation rely on
both laboratory and field experiments. The two main advantages of studying unethical
behaviour in the laboratory are the possibility of measuring its occurrence and quantify-
ing the payoff consequences. To illustrate, consider a salesperson tasked with submitting
a subjective review report on customer satisfaction. To determine whether information
in the report has been inflated, it is necessary to ascertain the salesperson’s belief about
the actual level of customer satisfaction as well as the expected material harm (or bene-
fit) to themselves and the company from such an action. In a field setting such measures
are rarely available. By contrast, in the laboratory such beliefs can be fixed by provid-
ing participants objective information about a true state and quantifying the payoff
consequences from honest and deceitful communication. In addition, the laboratory en-
vironment allows individuals to be randomly assigned to different institutions, such as a
public good setting with or without punishment (Chapters 1 and 2) or a work task with
tournament or team incentives (Chapter 3). At the same time, the abstract environment
of the laboratory has its limitations for tackling certain research questions. A principal
objective of the work in Chapter 4 is to study the viability of the Pay-What-You-Want
pricing mechanism for purchasing ethical products. For this we needed participants to
make actual purchase decisions and thus opted for a field experiment.
Chapter 1, entitled ‘Lying and Public Goods’ and joint work with Bernd Irlenbusch
(University of Cologne) examines the behavioural implications of lying in the well-studied
setting of public good provision, in which individual agents need to cooperate in order to
achieve a socially optimal outcome. While cooperation is typically difficult to achieve,
certain mechanisms such as costly peer-punishment are generally effective in mitigating
the free-rider problem. In an experiment we evaluate the effectiveness of the punishment
mechanism in a public good setting where individuals do not receive feedback about the
contributions of others but have a possibility to communicate to one another what they
have contributed. This setting gives rise to a number of constraints to full cooperation.
First, it is possible that group members do not believe announcements of their fellow
group members. From the perspective of maximizing contributions, this is problematic
for subjects who contribute to the public good when they know that others are doing so
as well. In addition, when peer punishment is introduced it is possible that punishment
is assigned to high contributors whose reports are not believed or less punishment is
assigned to low contributors who get away with an inflated announcement. We find
evidence for both constraints in our experiment, which reduces overall contributions
and earnings compared to the standard public good game.
Implicit in this work is that individuals make systematic mistakes when interpreting
potentially dishonest messages. This is a necessary condition for deception to occur:
the sender must believe that their message can influence the beliefs of the other party.
Chapter 2, entitled ‘Fooling the Nice Guys’ and joint work with Bernd Irlenbusch (Uni-
versity of Cologne) investigates this in the same public good setting featured in Chapter
1. We find that a false consensus effect can partially explain how group members form
beliefs based on the messages they receive. Using an independent proxy of contribution
tendency, we find that subjects who are likely to contribute to the public good are more
likely to believe messages that others are also contributing. While individuals with a
tendency to free-ride show the opposite pattern, we cannot exclude the possibility that
these individuals are simply well calibrated in their beliefs about actual contributions.
Together, these first two chapters show that lying aversion explains behaviour in a sym-
metric public good setting and that own behavioural tendencies can partially explain
how receivers interpret messages of others. Furthermore, the possibility for lying in a
public setting constrains full cooperation even in the presence of an otherwise efficient
solution mechanism.
Chapter 3 examines the reverse relationship by exploring the effects of mechanism design
on lying behaviour. In a laboratory experiment subjects work under either a piece rate,
team incentives or a tournament scheme and then are presented with another task in
which they can be dishonest for a monetary gain. Rather than testing for a direct
effect on dishonesty, the results from this study are the first to provide support for the
notion that monetary incentives can affect dishonesty in a subsequent unrelated task.
In particular, working under the tournament incentive negatively affects honesty. In
addition, when relative performance information is provided, this feedback appears to
decrease honesty for workers who under- or outperform their work partner by a small
amount. From a theoretical perspective these results are informative on what determines
dishonest behaviour in individuals. In addition, they are instructive for mechanism
designers who care about honesty.
The dissertation closes with Chapter 4, entitled ‘Are social investments rewarded?’ and
joint work with Ayelet Gneezy (University of California, San Diego). It is slightly differ-
ent from the previous chapters in that it focuses on ethical consumption, where individual
consumers choose to purchase a product that directly or indirectly contributes to the
welfare of a third party. The key questions in this paper are first whether the motiva-
tion of social preferences and self-identity concerns play a role in ethical consumption
decisions and second, whether this would make a Pay-What-You-Want pricing mecha-
nism more viable for ethical products. The Pay-What-You-Want pricing mechanism is
suitable for studying this question because it allows people to determine their own price.
As such we expect that if individuals have social preferences or self-identity concerns
for ethical products, this should translate into higher payments. We test this in a field
experiment by offering a regular and Fair Trade product to customers at a local Farmer’s
Market. Customers are either presented the products separately or together. The results
show that customers pay more for the Fair Trade product than the non-certified alter-
native when the two are offered together. However, this difference disappears when the
products are offered separately. Specifically, payments for the regular product decrease
when it is presented next to the Fair Trade alternative compared to when this product
is offered on its own. Since there is no movement in payments for the Fair Trade, these
results do not support that social preferences or self-identity concerns translate into
higher payments.
Chapter 1
Lying in public good games with and
without punishment
Joint work with Bernd Irlenbusch, University of Cologne
Abstract
We experimentally study a public good setting where accurate contribution feedback
is not available and group members can send non-verifiable cheap talk messages about
their contributions. As feedback, subjects receive only announced contributions or the
announced or actual contribution with 50% probability. In this setting, we explore both
information transmission and reception as well as the effectiveness of costly peer punish-
ment. Overall, we find that cooperation breaks down in all announcement treatments
except when actual contribution feedback is provided some of the time and punishment
is available. We identify various constraints to full cooperation relative to the stan-
dard public good game. First, subjects make errors in adjusting their beliefs for the
announcements of others and, on average, adjust their beliefs downward for a given
announcement. Second, we find that significantly more punishment is assigned to high
contributors compared to the standard public good game. Furthermore, punishment for
low contributors appears to have a smaller disciplining effect. When actual contribution
information is provided some of the time we find that these constraints are less severe
compared to the setting where only announcements are available. However, when only
announcements are displayed there is an overall decrease in punishment levels relative
to the other treatments and it also fails to discipline low contributors. We do not find
a mark-up in punishment for lying in any of the announcement treatments.
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1.1 Introduction
A plethora of economic activities are characterised by public good structures where co-
operation is essential for success. Examples include collaboration in teams, charity do-
nations, and international endeavours to protect the environment. It therefore comes as
no surprise that researchers have invested considerable effort to mitigate the free-riding
problem in public good provision (Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). Two particularly
prominent insights emerged from this literature. First, many people are conditional co-
operators meaning that their contributions to a public good increase when it is known
that others contribute as well (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Keser and Van Winden, 2000).
Second, bilateral punishment mechanisms can be used to discipline free-riders and these
are effective to sustain cooperation even if punishment is costly for the punisher (Yamag-
ishi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2000; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002). Both
insights have been successfully used to design mechanisms that induce higher contri-
butions (Ostrom, 1990; Frey and Meier, 2004; Ga¨chter, 2007; List and Lucking-Reiley,
2002; Shang and Croson, 2009). Such mechanisms, however, crucially depend on the
assumption that potential contributors have access to reliable information about the
contributions of others. In many situations such an assumption seems unwarranted.
Consider the case of fisheries management where accurate catch data is crucial in en-
forcing control systems such as total allowable catch and transferable quotas. While it
is possible to track the vessel’s movement and time at sea, it is difficult to record the
exact catch size in an accurate and timely fashion (Beddington et al., 2007). While
authorities rely on some form of monitoring, for example by letting observers perform
random checks of the vessel’s equipment, collecting fully accurate catch information is
prohibitively costly. Unreliable information on contributions is also present in other set-
tings. In teams, for example, group members work in spatial distances from each other
such that individual effort levels are hardly mutually observable. Privacy considerations
can also prevent the disclosure of reliable contribution information, such as in the case
of charity donations.
Instead, the information that is often available is what others announce about their
team efforts, fish catch, donations and so forth. For fisheries, it is common for individual
fishermen to keep records of their catch in a manual or electronic logbook (Barkai et al.,
2012). These numbers are consequently aggregated to determine quotas and forecasts,
supplemented by other scientific measurements of the fish stock. The advantage of
using logbooks is that information is immediate and collecting is relatively inexpensive.
However, it is subject to misreporting. Fishermen can record a lower catch volume in
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the books, which leads to a bias in official statistics1 (Gagern et al., 2013; Pauly et al.,
2013).
A public good setting where contribution feedback is not available, but communication
is possible between group members generates important new questions for the public
good literature. First, how honest are participants and to what degree do they trust
the announcements of others? Conditioning own contributions on announcements that
are not trusted seems problematic. Further, administering bilateral punishment is not
straightforward. Would one refrain from punishing somebody who reports a high con-
tribution? Or would one rather exert a particularly high punishment if one believes
that the actual contribution was low and on top of that the announcement has been
a lie? How do contributions develop over time when feedback is (partially) based on
announcements?
To shed light on these questions we experimentally investigate the impact of participants’
non-verifiable announcements about their own contributions on public good provision.
First, we investigate to what extent group members lie about their contributions and
how others perceive this information. Second, we examine possible inefficiencies that this
creates in a public good setting with and without presence of costly peer punishment.
In our study we employ a standard repeated public good setting. The new feature is that
participants make an announcement about their contribution after they decide about
their actual contributions. They are free to announce whatever contribution they want
irrespective of what they actually contributed. Payoffs are based on actual contribu-
tions and not on announcements. We employ a 2 x 2 experimental design. On one
dimension we consider public good settings with and without punishment. To assess
the effect of credibility of announcements, we vary the probability with which the an-
nouncements of the subjects are taken as feedback or whether true feedback is provided
on the other dimension. Announcements are either taken as feedback with certainty (in
treatments ANN and P-ANN) or with a probability of 0.5 (in treatments ACT/ANN
and P-ACT/ANN). We also include a belief measure to evaluate to what extent an-
nouncements of others are believed and how subjects condition their contribution and
punishment behaviour on these beliefs. For comparison we also include a treatment
with a standard public goods game with punishment which entails only true feedback
(treatment P-ACT).
1There is some support that such misreporting is taking place. In 2010, the amount of Mediter-
anean Bluefin tuna reaching the market exceeded the reported catch amount by 40% (Gagern et al.,
2013). Similarly, the Chinese fleet is estimated to have caught 4.6 million metric tons a year in distant
waters between 2000 and 2011, of which less than 10% was reported to the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (Pauly et al., 2013).
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We find that cooperation breaks down in all announcement treatments except when
actual contribution feedback is provided some of the time and punishment is avail-
able (P-ACT/ANN). Here punishment holds contributions at intermediate levels, even
though it is not efficient in terms of earnings. Driving these effects, we identify vari-
ous constraints to full cooperation across the announcement treatments relative to the
standard public good game. First, subjects make errors in adjusting their beliefs for
the announcements of others and, on average, adjust their beliefs downward. Second,
we find that significantly more punishment is assigned to high contributors compared
to the standard public good game and that these contributors reduce their subsequent
contributions. Furthermore, punishment for low contributors appears to have a smaller
disciplining effect. When actual contribution information is provided some of the time
we find that these inefficiencies are less severe compared to the setting where only an-
nouncements are available. However, when only announcements are displayed there is
an overall decrease in punishment levels relative to the other treatments and it also fails
to discipline low contributors. We do not find a mark-up in punishment for lying in any
of the announcement treatments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we summarize the rel-
evant literature and derive hypotheses in section 3. Section 4 describes the experimental
design. Section 5 presents our findings, followed by a discussion in section 6. Section 7
concludes.
1.2 Literature review
Several studies look at the effectiveness of public good provision and the punishment
mechanism when the assumption of accurate contribution feedback is relaxed. Ambrus
and Greiner (2012) evaluate a public good game with a binary strategy space of a full
or zero contribution. In case subjects choose to contribute to the public good, there
is a small probability that their contribution is displayed as zero to the other group
members. In addition, subjects have the possibility to punish group members at a
cost. They find that average earnings are lower in settings with noise and standard
punishment technology. A stronger punishment technology, where each point invested
in punishment reduces the target’s earnings by 6 points, is more effective in maintaining
high contributions, although average earnings do not improve beyond that of the no-
punishment control group. The authors attribute this efficiency loss to continued use
of the punishment mechanism in the treatments with noise. In the standard public
good game, punishment is used in the initial rounds but then phases out, resulting in
efficiency gains. Grechenig et al. (2010) find a similar result in a public good game
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where subjects can contribute anything between 0 to 20 points. With some positive
probability, the subject’s actual contribution is replaced by a random number from the
strategy space and given as feedback to the other group members. In other words, it
is possible for a low contribution to be displayed as high, and vice versa. Costly peer
punishment is effective in maintaining high contributions when actual contributions
are displayed in 100% or 90% of the cases. Cooperation breaks down when accuracy
drops to 50%. However, even under minimal noise (90% accuracy) average earnings
are not higher than the treatments without punishment. There are several studies that
manipulate contribution feedback but do not include a punishment mechanism. Work
by Nikiforakis (2010) finds that subjects contribute less to the public good if they receive
feedback about earnings rather than contributions. In the absence of any contribution
feedback, Neugebauer et al. (2009) and Sell and Wilson (1991) find that contributions
are stable over time compared to a control treatment where contribution feedback is
provided. Finally, there is substantial literature on the role of communication in public
good provision. Generally, communication improves public good provision (Dawes et al.,
1977; Isaac and Walker, 1988; Brosig et al., 2003a; Bochet et al., 2006) even when no
contribution feedback is provided (Wilson and Sell, 1997; Cason and Khan, 1999).
To our knowledge, two papers have thus far looked at lying in public good settings. The
first is Hoffmann et al. (2013) who study the effect of inflated feedback on contribu-
tions. In the experiment, feedback about the group average contribution is exogenously
inflated by 25%, or identical to one’s own contribution if the individual is contributing
above the group average. They find that inflated feedback is successful in raising contri-
butions as long as high contributors remain unaware that they are contributing above
the group average. The second paper, by Serra-Garcia et al. (2013), looks at the content
of communication on lying and free-riding in a 2-player one-shot public good game. The
experimental setting features an informed player who has private information about the
MPCR to the public good and can communicate this to the uninformed player. They
find that subjects lie less when the message describes future behaviour (‘I contribute’)
compared to when they are describing a state (‘the return is high’).
Our work differs from and adds to these previous studies in three important ways. First,
rather than introducing noisy feedback exogenously, any discrepancy between actual and
displayed contribution information in our experiment is created by the subjects them-
selves. In other words, we look at endogenous feedback distortion, where accuracy in
feedback depends on honesty. This makes it important to understand the degree to
which subjects are honest, as well how they perceive the messages of other group mem-
bers. From this perspective, the inclusion of our belief measure is an important addition
to previous studies. Second, we evaluate this in a repeated public good setting in which
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subjects do not receive accurate contribution feedback during the rounds of the experi-
ment. In previous work on the role of communication, subjects typically communicate
before making their contribution decisions. Subjects then receive accurate feedback on
what their fellow group members actually decided before moving to the next round.
Even though it is possible for subjects to make false promises in this context, any dis-
crepancies are immediately revealed by the feedback mechanism. We focus on situations
where such verification is not (immediately) possible. Finally, since we include a mea-
sure of beliefs, we can investigate how honest and dishonest messages affect subjects’
perceptions about the contributions of others. This allows us to answer questions on
conditional cooperation and motivations behind punishment behaviour when reliable
contribution feedback is not available.
1.3 Hypotheses
To formulate our hypotheses we make several assumptions about the motivations of
subjects in the public good game with respect to their contribution and lying behaviour.
Note that these hypotheses are not meant to provide a definitive account of the underly-
ing mechanisms. They simply serve to make plausible predictions about behaviour based
on the canonical model of rational self-interested agents and well-supported behavioural
alternatives. We entertain four constellations of motivations for subjects:
1. Only self-interested subjects and no cost of lying
2. Only self-interested subjects and moderate cost of lying
3. A proportion of conditional cooperators and no cost of lying
4. A proportion of conditional cooperators and moderate cost of lying
These four constellations speak first to the driver of contribution behaviour (self-interest
or conditional cooperation) and second, to the motivation to misrepresent one’s contri-
bution (no or moderate costs of lying). We discuss each of these in turn.
The canonical model postulates that subjects are motivated exclusively by monetary
self-interest. Since the marginal per capita rate of return to investment in the public
good is lower than 1, it is individually rational for each subject to invest everything in the
private account and contribute zero to the public good. In reconciling this assumption
with experimental evidence on contributions in public good games, Fischbacher et al.
(2001) and important follow-up work (Frey and Meier, 2004; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter,
2010) identify a proportion of subjects as conditional cooperators. Rather than being
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driven by self-interest, these subjects are willing to contribute to the public good if other
group members are also contributing. For these individuals, beliefs about what others
are contributing are key in understanding contribution behaviour.
When it comes to misrepresenting one’s contributions, we again start with the assump-
tion of the canonical model that individuals do not experience any psychological disutility
from communicating dishonest messages. The assumption that individuals have no costs
of lying2 has been challenged in a growing literature on lying aversion (Gneezy, 2005;
Mazar et al., 2008; Sutter, 2009; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi,
2013). For example, Gneezy et al. (2013a) and Gibson et al. (2013) identify different
types of people according to their lying costs, i.e. those who are totally honest or dishon-
est, or those who vary their lying behaviour depending on the potential private rewards
and harm caused to the other party. In formulating our hypotheses for instances (2)
and (4), we follow this assumption that individuals are heterogeneous in their lying costs
and that these costs, on average, are non-negligible.
1.3.1 Incentives for lying in the public good game
If subjects are motivated exclusively by monetary self-interest, they follow the dominant
strategy of zero contributions to the public account. Their beliefs about what others are
contributing is irrelevant for their own contribution decision. Since the subject’s contri-
bution decision is not dependent on beliefs about the contributions of others, it follows
that communicating a number different from one’s actual contribution does not yield any
material benefit. Given that there are no incentives for lying, we expect contributions
to be disclosed honestly whenever the utility function of subjects can be characterized
exclusively by monetary self-interest. This prediction does not change when we intro-
duce moderate lying costs in instance (2).
Hypothesis 1a. If subjects are driven purely by self-interest, contributions to the public
good are zero and there are no dishonest announcements irrespective of the lying costs
of the subjects.
This prediction changes when we assume that a proportion of subjects are conditional
cooperators. Since the contribution decision of these subjects is based on their beliefs
2We use ‘costs of lying’ as a general term to refer to the psychological disutility experienced by telling
a lie. We are not specific in whether these costs derive from an inherent aversion to telling lies (Gneezy,
2005; Vanberg, 2008) or through the experience of guilt (Battigalli et al., 2013).
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about what others are investing in the public account, it can be beneficial to the indi-
vidual subject to announce a higher contribution than what was actually contributed.
If this inflated announcement translates into higher beliefs about actual group contribu-
tions, conditional cooperators can be expected to contribute more compared to a setting
in which contribution feedback is accurate. Since the returns to investment in the pub-
lic account are shared equally among the participants, this represents a monetary gain
for the liar at the expense of the contributing group member. Given that this gain is
only present when conditional cooperators are convinced that the group contributions
are higher than they actually are, it follows that there are no incentives for subjects
to underreport their actual contribution. Simply stated, subjects face a trade-off be-
tween reporting their actual contribution honestly or inflating it by communicating a
higher number. Thus, the presence of conditional cooperators in the subject pool creates
incentives for subjects to overstate their actual contributions.
In instance (3) where we assume no costs of lying, we expect subjects to overstate their
actual contributions to the largest degree possible. For self-interested subjects, this
would express itself as a contribution of zero to the public good coupled with a high
announcement. We would expect higher contribution levels from conditional coopera-
tors, but again coupled with inflated announcements. Since there are no incentives to
underreport, it follows that this behaviour ‘contaminates’ higher announcements levels,
since these can reflect both high actual contributions or an exaggerated report.
Hypothesis 1b. If a proportion of subjects are conditional cooperators and the subjects
experience no cost of lying, announcements will be strongly inflated relative to actual
contributions.
If subjects face non-negligible costs of lying (instance 4), we expect subjects to announce
their contribution honestly or overstate by less compared to when lying costs are zero.
This implies that high announcements are more credible than in instance (3), since
there is now an increased likelihood that these announcements actually correspond to
high contributions.
Hypothesis 1c. If a proportion of subjects are conditional cooperators and the subjects
experience a cost of lying, there will be a small or moderate inflation of announcements
relative to actual contributions.
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The observant reader will notice that these predictions hinge on certain assumptions
about how announcements are interpreted by the other group members. If we assume
that receivers detect lies correctly and adjust their beliefs appropriately, lying cannot
be successful in convincing conditional cooperators that contributions are higher than
they actually are. Again, this removes the incentive for subjects to misrepresent their
contributions. While the assumption of perfectly rational receivers is used in some the-
oretical work (Crawford, 2003; Kartik et al., 2007), a number of experimental papers
show that individuals often make mistakes in detecting lies (Blume et al., 2001; Charness
and Dufwenberg, 2006; Wang et al., 2010; Sheremeta and Shields, 2013) even though
receivers’ beliefs, on average, do respond to structural factors that affect the underlying
deception rate (Belot et al., 2012; Sutter, 2009; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010). For
a detailed analysis on receivers’ interpretation of cheap talk messages in a public good
game with announcements, see Irlenbusch and Ter Meer (2013) or chapter 2 of this work.
We follow the general behavioural assumption here in that the recipients of cheap talk
messages do not accurately adjust for lying, but that subjects are attuned to the general
incentive structure underlying lying behaviour. In our experiment, this implies that, on
average, subjects should revise their beliefs downward rather than upward to account
for the possibility that group members are overstating their contributions.
Hypothesis 2a. If subjects are fully rational, there will be no discrepancy between an-
nouncements and subjects’ beliefs about underlying actual contributions.
Hypothesis 2b. Subjects make errors when adjusting their beliefs and on average revise
their beliefs downward for a given announcement.
1.3.2 Treatment-specific hypotheses
Having set the stage regarding lying behaviour in the public good game, we now derive
further hypotheses specific to our treatments.
The difference between the ACT/ANN and ANN treatments is that in ACT/ANN the
subject’s actual contribution is given as feedback to the other group members with
probability 0.5, whereas this has a probability of 0 in ANN. In other words, in the ANN
treatments only the subject’s announced contribution is displayed as feedback. All of
this is common knowledge to the subjects and clearly emphasized in the instructions
and control questions (see appendix A.2). This weak form of monitoring in the experi-
ment gives subjects in the ACT/ANN treatments more certainty that the information
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they are receiving on the feedback screen is accurate, at least with 50% probability or
higher if they believe group members are honest. This adds credibility to the reported
contributions in the ACT/ANN treatments.
Hypothesis 3. Reported contributions are more credible in the P-ACT/ANN and AC-
T/ANN treatments compared to the P-ANN and ANN treatments.
This has implications for both contribution and punishment behaviour. Since displayed
contributions are more likely to be credible in the ACT/ANN treatments it allows con-
ditional cooperators to condition stronger on reported feedback.
Hypothesis 4. Conditional on reported contributions, subjects in P-ACT/ANN and
ACT/ANN contribute more to the public good than those in the P-ANN and ANN treat-
ments.
Hypothesis 5. In the absense of punishment, contributions in ACT/ANN will be higher
than in ANN.
For our predictions on punishment, we start with the observation that, contrary to the
canonical model of self-interested agents, a proportion of subjects are willing to exert
costly punishment towards group members (Ga¨chter and Fehr, 2000; Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2002) and that, generally, low contributions are punished more frequently and severely
than contributions closer to the social optimum (Herrmann et al., 2008). In a setting
where contribution feedback is distorted, inferences about group members’ contributions
to the joint account are not as straightforward as in the standard public good game.
Particularly for high announcements, it is possible that a discrepancy exists between
actual contributions and beliefs, in which (i) a group member is believed to make a low
contribution when this person’s actual contribution is in fact high, or (ii) a group mem-
ber is believed to make a high contribution when this person’s actual contribution is in
fact low. This implies that punishment is more likely to be misdirected in P-ACT/ANN
and P-ANN due to erroneous beliefs compared to the standard public good game. This
reduces the effectiveness of the punishment mechanism for two reasons. First, if there is
a positive probability that the announcement is to some extent believed, the free-rider
will receive less punishment than in a public good game where contribution feedback
is accurate. This can reduce the disciplining effect of punishment for free-riders to in-
crease their contributions (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Second, high contributors that
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are punished may react adversely by reducing their subsequent contributions (Herrmann
et al., 2008). We have no a priori hypotheses on which of these mechanisms would un-
derlie the reduced effectiveness of punishment in ACT/ANN and ANN compared to
the standard public good game with punishment. However, our experimental data does
allow us to evaluate the role of each of these explanations. Furthermore, if reported con-
tributions are more credible in the ACT/ANN treatments, it follows that for subjects
who are willing to punish, punishment is correctly targeted with a higher probability.
Hypothesis 6. Punishment is less effective in raising contributions in P-ACT/ANN
and P-ANN compared to the standard public good game, P-ACT.
Hypothesis 7. Punishment is less effective in raising contributions in P-ANN than
P-ACT/ANN.
In this section we have outlined several sources of inefficiency that are specific to the
public good game with endogenous noise. First, the presence of conditional cooperators
creates incentives for subjects to overstate their actual contributions. Depending on the
lying costs of the subjects, we can expect contributions to be moderately or strongly
inflated, leading to a contamination of high reported contributions. These can reflect an
honest announcement or an exaggerated report. If subjects adjust their beliefs down-
ward, we can expect conditional cooperators to contribute less than in the standard
public good game for a given report. Two other possible inefficiencies originate from
the punishment mechanism as described under hypothesis 6: if subjects are not well
calibrated in their beliefs, free-riders can escape punishment when announcing high or
high contributors receive punishment when their (honest) reports are not believed. Since
each of these inefficiencies are absent in the standard public good game, we expect that
the standard public good game with punishment results in higher overall contributions
than both the P-ACT/ANN and P-ANN treatments. In addition, extending the argu-
ment made under hypothesis 5 and 7, we would also expect contributions to be higher
in P-ACT/ANN compared to P-ANN.
Hypothesis 8. Overall contributions will be higher in P-ACT than in P-ACT/ANN
and P-ANN.
Hypothesis 9. Overall contributions are higher in P-ACT/ANN than in P-ANN.
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1.4 Experimental Design
In all experimental sessions, subjects played a four-person public good game with stan-
dard parameters (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002). The game is repeated for 15 rounds and
subjects stay in the same group throughout the experiment. At the start of each round
subjects receive an endowment of 20 points, which they allocate either to themselves or
to a shared account. Each point kept for oneself increases the subject’s earnings by 1
point, whereas those allocated to the group account are multiplied by a factor of 1.6 and
equally divided over the four group members.
We introduce communication through a post-hoc announcement mechanism, which is
inserted immediately after the actual investment decision. Here, each subject makes
a non-binding payoff-irrelevant announcement on how many points he or she has con-
tributed to the group project on the previous screen. Subjects have the possibility to
lie by reporting a lower or higher number than what they actually contributed. Thus,
whether such a discrepancy between actual and announced contribution exists is entirely
up to the individual subject. Both the actual investment decision and the announcement
are made simultaneously by all group members. After the announcements have been
made, subjects move to the feedback stage where they receive information about the
individual contribution decisions of each of their fellow group members. Feedback is dis-
played anonymously and in random order to prevent subjects from tracking individual
behaviour across periods.
Within this basic framework, we introduce two treatment variations. The first is the
punishment mechanism, which is either present or absent. In the treatments with pun-
ishment, subjects have the possibility to assign punishment points in the feedback stage.
Subjects are given 10 additional points per round that can be invested in punishment.
Each point invested reduces the earnings of the targeted subject by three points. Any
unused punishment points are added to the subject’s individual earnings, thereby mak-
ing punishment costly to administer. Each subject is subsequently informed about the
sum of punishment points they received (if any) and the game is repeated until all fifteen
rounds are finished. Subjects receive aggregate information on actual contributions and
earnings only at the end of the experiment.
The payoff formula for each subject i is as follows:
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where ci represents the contribution of subject i to the group project. p
i
j indicates
how much punishment subject i receives from subject j 6= i where i,j ∈ {1, ..., 4}.
Importantly, announcements are not payoff-relevant. Only the actual contributions and
punishment of the subject and other group members enter the payoff function.
Our second treatment variation determines the information subjects receive in the feed-
back stage. In ACT, feedback on the contributions of the group members reflects their
actual contribution decision in all instances. This is identical to the standard public
good game, in which contribution feedback is always accurate. By contrast, in the ANN
treatments, information displayed only reflects whatever was announced. ACT/ANN
lies in between the two extremes. With 50% probability, the number displayed on the
feedback screen reflects either the subject’s actual or announced contribution. This is
determined for each group member individually. Each displayed contribution on the
feedback screen can reflect either the actual or announced contribution of the group
member.
Given that the contribution information provided on the feedback screen is not neces-
sarily accurate, we record what subjects believe about the actual contributions of the
other group members. We elicit these beliefs in the feedback stage for each displayed
contribution of the other group members, which provides us with three belief measures
per subject per round. This belief elicitation is not incentivized, since past experimental
work suggests it can affect contribution decisions (Ga¨chter and Renner, 2010; Croson,
2000).
Table 1.1: Overview of the different treatments
Feedback
Actual Actual/Announced Announced
Punishment P-ACT P-ACT/ANN P-ANN
(n = 56) (n = 52) (n = 56)
No Punishment ACT/ANN ANN
(n = 56) (n = 56)
Number of participants in brackets. In P-ACT/ANN one of the groups of 4 participants could not
be established because one of the registered subjects did not show up.
Table 1.1 summarizes our five treatments according to the variations of punishment and
feedback. We label each treatment according to whether the punishment mechanism was
present or absent (indicated by the letter ‘P’) and what information subjects are provided
as feedback (actual contributions, announcements, or a mixture of both with equal
probability). Thus, the label P-ACT/ANN refers to the treatment with punishment
and actual or announced contributions as feedback.
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The five treatments were conducted over 10 sessions (two per treatment) at the eco-
nomics laboratory at the University of Cologne, Germany. We recruited a total of 276
undergraduate and graduate students to participate using the ORSEE online recruit-
ment system (Greiner, 2004). This corresponds to 13 independent observations in the
P-ACT/ANN treatment and 14 independent observations in each of the other treat-
ments. The lower number in P-ACT/ANN was due to an insufficient number of par-
ticipants arriving for the experiment. The mean age of participants is 23.3 years, with
52.7% female. The vast majority of participants were German nationals from a range
of academic disciplines, including economics and business. No subject participated in
any of the sessions more than once. Upon entering the lab, participants were seated
at individually separated computers and given instructions. They had to successfully
complete a set of control questions to ensure their understanding of the game before the
experiment continued. Except for the instructions, the experiment was computerized
and programmed using the z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007). Each ses-
sion lasted approximately 80 minutes and subjects were paid, on average, e 12.52 at an
exchange rate of 50 ECU to e 1.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Overall contributions and earnings
Figure 1.1 depicts contributions to the public good over the fifteen periods with the
punishment treatments in the left panel and those without punishment on the right. It
shows that contributions converge to the social optimum in the treatment with accurate
feedback, P-ACT, but not in either announcement treatment, P-ACT/ANN and P-ANN.
Contributions in P-ANN seem to fall over time to levels similar to that in the treatments
without punishment. However, when accurate feedback is available some of the time,
punishment seems to hold contributions at intermediate levels. Mann-Whitney U-tests
(MWU)3 at the level of independent observation confirm that contributions in P-ACT
are significantly higher than both P-ACT/ANN (p < 0.01) and P-ANN (p < 0.01).
Yet, P-ACT/ANN does better than the treatments without punishment (both p < 0.01)
and compared to P-ANN (p = 0.029) when we restrict our analysis to the final five
periods of the game. Comparing contributions over the entire game results in weakly
higher contributions in P-ACT/ANN compared to P-ANN (p = 0.081). We test for
time trends non-parametrically using a binomial test on the Spearman rank correlation
coefficient between contribution and period number for each independent observation.
In the treatments without punishment and P-ANN, the rank correlation coefficient is
3Unless otherwise specified, all reported non-parametric tests are two-sided.


































































Figure 1.1: Contributions to the public good over time across treatments
negative significantly more often than chance, indicating that contributions fall over
time (p < 0.01). While contributions rise in P-ACT (p < 0.01), no significant downward
or upward trend was detected for P-ACT/ANN (p = 0.58). Table 1.2 provides detailed
descriptive statistics on contributions and other variables of interest, such as average
earnings. Despite moderate public good contributions in P-ACT/ANN, earnings in this
treatment are significantly lower than in P-ACT but also compared to the no-punishment
treatments (MWU, all p < 0.01).
Thus, these results support hypotheses 8 and 9 in that contributions are higher in P-
ACT/ANN than in P-ANN, but that neither are as high compared to the standard
public good game, P-ACT. We do not find that contributions are higher in ACT/ANN
compared to the ANN treatment and thus fail to support hypothesis 5. We discuss these
results in detail in section 1.6.
1.5.2 Lying and beliefs
A unique feature of our experimental design is that accurate contribution feedback is
obscured and that subjects can send non-verifiable announcements about their contri-
bution. As such, the degree of feedback distortion hinges on subjects’ honesty in their
Chapter 1. Lying in public good games 16
Table 1.2: General descriptive statistics
Average Average Average Average
contribution lie punishment earnings (e )
Actual Feedback
Punishment 17.49 0.20 11.42
(4.55) (0.86)
Actual / Announced
Punishment 10.68 4.00 0.53 9.03
(7.08) (5.10) (1.36)
No Punishment 5.03 5.83 9.91
(6.04) (5.61)
Announced feedback
Punishment 6.79 10.35 0.14 9.71
(7.59) (8.09) (0.64)
No Punishment 5.24 10.54 9.94
(7.21) (7.93)
Standard deviations are show in brackets.
announcements as well as the beliefs about these announcements of others in the group.
We evaluate these next.
Lying is prevalent in the experiment. On average, announcements are truthful4 less than
a third of time. In line with previous work (Gneezy, 2005; Gibson et al., 2013), we find
subjects that never lie (∼10%), always lie (∼21.8%) or show a mix between honest and
dishonest announcements (∼68.2%) across the treatments. The black line in figure 1.2
represents average reported contributions for each level of actual contribution, clustered
in blocks of three. The actual underlying contribution is indicated by the solid gray
reference line and beliefs about the underlying actual contribution are represented by
the dashed black line. Average reports are significantly higher than actual contributions
in all treatments (WSR, p < 0.01). When accurate contribution feedback is displayed
some of the time, subjects overstate their contributions by an average of 4 and 5.83
points in the treatments with and without punishment respectively. When only an-
nouncements are displayed these averages are 10.35 and 10.54 points for the punishment
and no-punishment treatments. This difference in average overstatements between the
ACT/ANN and ANN treatments is significant (MWU, both p < 0.01)5.
4We label an announcement as truthful when it exactly corresponds with the subject’s actual contri-
bution in that period.
5This result remains significant at the 1% level when, instead of comparing absolute lies, we consider
the discrepancy between announced and actual contribution as a percentage of how much the subject can
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We find support for the hypothesis that subjects overstate their actual contributions, in
line with what we would expect if a proportion of subjects are conditional cooperators
and lying is not prohibitively costly for all subjects. However, we observe significantly
higher overstatements in the ANN treatments compared to ACT/ANN. Thus, we find
support for both hypothesis 1b and 1c. We postpone our discussion of this result to
section 1.6.
overstate. This addresses the concern that high contributors lie less because they have less possibility
to overstate, since announcements are capped at 20 by design.
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Figure 1.2: Beliefs and displayed contributions across treatments.
Note how the reference line representing actual contributions does not exactly form a 45-degree
line. This is due to the overrepresentation of certain contribution levels, namely 5, 10 and 15, which







































































































































































































E rors i  belief adjustment
Errors in belief adjustment
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To evaluate perceptions of honesty, we compare subjects’ beliefs about the actual con-
tribution of each of the group members. Figure 1.3 displays the distribution of belief
errors, i.e., the difference between the subject’s belief and the actual contribution un-
derlying the group member’s announcement. The histograms show that while subjects
are accurate in their beliefs approximately 35 - 45 percent of the time across treatments,
the majority of belief errors are different from zero. This is significant for all treatments
according to a signed rank test (WSR, p < 0.01). Furthermore, the figure shows that
belief errors are on average positive, which indicates that subjects adjust their beliefs
downward for a given announcement. Both these findings are in line with hypothesis 2b.
In terms of treatment differences, we hypothesized that the reported contributions in
ACT/ANN would be more credible than in ANN (hypothesis 3). Since actual contri-
bution feedback is sometimes displayed in the ACT/ANN treatments, subjects have
more certainty that what they are observing as feedback is correct. The discrepancy
between displayed contributions and what is believed is indeed smaller in treatments
P-ACT/ANN and ACT/ANN (an average of 2.31 and 2.96 points, respectively) than
in P-ANN and ANN (on average 8.40 and 8.20 points, respectively), which is signifi-
cant in all pairwise comparisons (MWU, p < 0.01). The solid and dashed black lines
in figure 1.2 show this difference graphically. For the P-ACT/ANN and ACT/ANN
treatments, the difference between the displayed contributions and underlying beliefs
is smaller than for the P-ANN and ANN treatments. It is important to note that in
both treatments, subjects lower their beliefs considerably when receiving announcements
from group members who are contributing at the social optimum (right hand size on the
x-axis in figure 1.2). For the highest contributions, average beliefs level off at around 12
points in P-ACT/ANN, 11 points in ACT/ANN and between 7 and 8 points in the ANN
treatments. In other words, someone who contributes 20 and announces this honestly
is perceived by fellow group members to be contributing, on average, between 7 and 12
points depending on the treatment.
To evaluate whether this matters for contribution behaviour, we run a Tobit regression
(see table 1.3 for results). We find support for hypothesis 4: in the ACT/ANN treat-
ments, subjects condition their contribution more strongly on received announcements
than in either of the ANN treatments. The coefficient for the average displayed reports
in the previous period is significant with a positive sign, indicating that subsequent con-
tributions increase for increases in average reports. The interaction terms between this
variable and the treatment dummies are significant and negative for both the P-ANN
and the ANN treatments, implying that reports are less important in the contribution
decisions of the subjects in the treatments where only announcements are displayed.
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Table 1.3: Tobit regression: the effect of reports on subject’s contribution decision
Dependent variable: Contribution








Av. displayed contribution (t-1) 1.449 ∗∗∗
[.282]
Av. displayed contribution (t-1) * P-ANN -1.049 ∗∗∗
[.356]
Av. displayed contribution (t-1) * ACT/ANN .491
[.507]








Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and indicated in square brackets. The ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable descrip-
tion: Period number : the period number; P-ANN, ACT/ANN; ANN : dummy for the respective
treatment. Note that P-ACT/ANN is the baseline condition here; Average displayed contribution
(t-1) : The average displayed contribution the subject sees on the feedback screen in period t-1;
Average displayed contribution (t-1) * P-ANN; ACT/ANN; ANN : The interaction term between
the treatment and average displayed contribution in period t-1;
1.5.3 The role of punishment
We now turn to the effects of the punishment mechanism. We hypothesized that erro-
neous beliefs in the ACT/ANN and ANN treatments could result in several inefficiencies
relative to the standard public good game. First, compared to the P-ACT treatment, it
is more likely that (i) a subject punishes a group member for a perceived low contribu-
tion when this person’s actual contribution is in fact higher, and (ii) a subject punishes
a group member less for a perceived high contribution when this person’s actual contri-
bution was in fact lower. Conditional on reactions to such punishment, this implies that
the punishment mechanism to be less effective than in the standard public good game.
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To evaluate this, we are interested in how punishment is assigned as well as how a
subject’s contribution responds to receiving punishment. To facilitate the presentation
of our results, we restrict our attention to the extremes of the contribution spectrum:
the low contributors, who contribute between 0 and 5 points to the public good; and
the high contributors, who provide 15 to 20 points of their endowment. We confirm our
findings with various regressions using the whole sample.
1.5.3.1 Punishment assigned
Figure 1.4 shows the difference between punishment assigned for actual contributions
(dark bars) and for what the believed contribution of the target is (light bars). Since
there is no discrepancy between actual and believed contributions in the standard public
good game, these two bars are identical in P-ACT. In line with our hypothesis for the
announcement treatments, subjects are assigning more punishment for contributions
they believe are low compared to punishment assigned for contributions that are low
in actuality. Reversely, subjects assign less punishment to contributions they perceive
to be high compared to punishment for actual high contributions. In P-ACT/ANN,
this difference between punishment assigned for actual and believed contributions is
significant for high contributions (WSR, p = 0.029). In P-ANN these patterns are
directionally true, but not significant at conventional levels.
These results refine insights from previous work on Ambrus and Greiner (2012) and
Grechenig et al. (2010), who find more anti-social punishment in public good games
where contribution feedback is noisy. However, for punishment to qualify as anti-social
it is necessary that the punisher intends to punish such high contributions. While we
corraborate their finding that anti-social punishment is higher in P-ACT/ANN than in
P-ACT (MWU, p = 0.015), our results show that this difference falls away when we
compare punishment according to the subject’s beliefs (MWU, p = 0.386).
Further, it is important to note that the overall punishment pattern appears different in
P-ANN than in the other two punishment treatments. Typically, low contributions are
punished more frequently and severely than contributions closer to the social optimum
(Herrmann et al., 2008). We find this pattern in P-ACT and P-ACT/ANN, where
significantly more punishment is assigned to low compared to high contributors (WSR,
P-ACT, p = 0.01; P-ACT/ANN, p < 0.01). However, in P-ANN, the difference between
punishment for low and high contributions is minimal. Furthermore, average punishment
assigned for low contributions in P-ANN is signficantly below that assigned in the other
two treatments (MWU, both p < 0.01).
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Figure 1.4: Punishment assigned for (perceived) low and high contributions across
treatments
The dark bars indicate the average punishment points assigned when the target’s actual contribution
lies between 0 and 5 for low contributors and between 15 to 20 points for contributions classified as
high. The treatments where announcements are (sometimes) displayed, P-ACT/ANN and P-ANN,
have an additional light bar that is constructed using the subject’s beliefs about what the target is
contributing. For low contributions, the light bar reflects how much punishment is assigned when
the target’s contribution is believed to lie between 0 and 5 points.
We confirm these insights from the non-parametric tests with several Tobit regressions,
the results of which are presented in table 1.4. The variable deviation captures how
much the target deviates from the social optimum of 20 points. In model 1 we use the
target’s actual deviation, whereas model 2 uses subjects’ beliefs. Thus, the deviation
variable in model 2 reflects how much the target is believed to be deviating from the
social optimum. In model 1, deviation is strongly significant with a positive sign in
the P-ACT treatment, indicating that the target receives more punishment the further
removed their contribution is from the social optimum of 20 points. In line with the
non-parametric results, the interaction term between the P-ANN treatment dummy
and deviation is significant with a negative sign in both models, indicating that the
target’s deviation plays a much less prominent role in determining punishment when
only announcements can be observed. For P-ACT/ANN, the interaction term is negative
and weakly significant, suggesting that stronger deviations from the social optimum
receive lower punishment compared to the standard public good game. This coefficient
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becomes insignificant when we move to model 2, in line with the non-parametric result
that subjects believe they are punishing low contributors more and high contributors
less than they actually are. Importantly, we do not find that more average punishment is
assigned in P-ACT/ANN compared to the standard public good game when controlling
for deviation from the social optimum.
Table 1.4: Tobit regression: the effect of actual and perceived deviations from the
social optimum on punishment assigned
Dependent variable: Punishment assigned
Model 1: Model 2:
Actual deviation Perceived deviation








Deviation * P-ACT/ANN -.211∗ -.112
[.113] [.123]








Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and indicated in square brackets. The ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable description:
Period number : the period number; Deviation : how much the target’s contribution deviates from the
social optimum of 20 points. Note how this variable is constructed using the subject’s beliefs in model
2; P-ACT/ANN; P-ANN : dummy for the respective treatment; Deviation * P-ACT/ANN; P-ANN :
interaction term between the treatment dummy and the target’s deviation from the social optimum.
We also run several regressions to check for a mark-up in punishment for dishonesty.
Using a Tobit regression (see appendix A.1 for results), we include variables to capture
the discrepancy between the target’s displayed contribution and how this is perceived
by the subject (ie. the lie the target is perceived to be telling). In addition, we include
a dummy with value 1 when the target is believed to be lying and 0 otherwise. Neither
variable is significant in the P-ACT/ANN or P-ANN treatments.
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1.5.3.2 Reactions to punishment
Table 1.5: Tobit regression: the effect of received punishment on contribution
Dependent variable: Contribution
Low contributors High contributors
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Period number -.251∗ -2.55∗ .169 .162
[.145] [.130] [.271] [.272]
Pun. received (t− 1) .649∗∗ 2.125∗∗∗ -2.270∗∗∗ -2.459∗∗∗
[.273] [.427] [.468] [.538]
P-ACT/ANN -4.748 1.976 -13.739∗∗∗ -14.558∗∗∗
[4.011] [2.369] [4.411] [4.919]
P-ANN -7.322∗ -1.180 -18.763∗∗∗ -18.833∗∗∗
[4.267] [2.471] [4.755] [4.857]
Pun. received (t− 1) -1.858∗∗∗ 1.088
* P-ACT/ANN [.451] [1.627]
Pun. received (t− 1) -2.721∗∗∗ .134
* P-ANN [.515] [3.083]
Constant 2.546 -2.551 44.545∗∗∗ 44.648∗∗∗
[3.836] [2.448] [5.657] [5.684]
N 581 581 1479 1479
R2 .036 .053 .068 .068
Left-censored 392 392 30 30
Right-censored 0 0 1296 1296
Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and indicated in square brackets. The ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable description:
Period number : the period number; Punishment received (t-1) : amount of punishment received
by all group members in the previous period; P-ACT/ANN : dummy that takes the value 1 when
the treatment is P-ACT/ANN and 0 otherwise; P-ANN : dummy that takes the value 1 when the
treatment is P-ANN and 0 otherwise.
Table 1.5 presents the results of various Tobit regressions to evaluate the effect of pun-
ishment received across treatments. The regressions in model 1 are restricted to those
classified as a low contributor in the preceding period (contributing 5 points or less),
whereas model 2 focuses on high contributors who contributed 15 points or more in the
previous round. We observe different effects of punishment across the treatments. For
those classified as low contributors, punishment received in the last round has a positive
effect on subsequent contribution when feedback is accurate (P-ACT). In P-ACT/ANN,
where announcements are provided as feedback some of the time, this disciplining ef-
fect is lower, albeit still positive. When only announcements are displayed (P-ANN),
the disciplining effect of punishment disappears and punishment in the previous round
seems to have a negative effect on the subsequent contribution of low contributors. For
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high contributions (model 2), the coefficient of punishment received in the last round
is strongly significant with a negative sign. The interaction terms between this variable
and the treatment dummies are not significant, indicating that high contributors who
receive punishment reduce their subsequent contributions across all treatments. In other
words, while the reaction to punishment of the high contributors is negative, it is not
more negative in the treatments with announcements.
These results on punishment assigned and reactions to punishment largely support hy-
potheses 6 and 7 in that punishment is less effective in the treatments with announce-
ments compared to the standard public good game and that punishment in P-ACT/ANN
is more effective than in P-ANN. However, the reasons for the lack of effectiveness of
punishment in P-ANN appears different from what we outlined under hypothesis 7. We
discuss this and other results in the next section.
1.6 Discussion
In terms of overall contributions, we find that cooperation breaks down in all treat-
ments except the standard public good game with punishment (P-ACT) and when ac-
tual contribution feedback is provided some of the time and punishment is available
(P-ACT/ANN). In the latter treatment, punishment holds contributions at intermedi-
ate levels, although it is inefficient in terms of earnings. In line with our hypotheses,
we find support for various constraints to full cooperation in the treatments with an-
nouncements compared to the standard public good game. First, subjects adjust their
beliefs downward for a given reported announcement. While subjects are generally right
to do so given the level of lying in the experiment, this also makes it more difficult for
high contributors to signal their contribution to the others in the group. We indeed
find that subjects systematically adjust their beliefs downward even for announcements
from group members who are contributing close to the social optimum. For subjects
classified as conditional cooperators, this discrepancy between actual contributions and
beliefs implies that their contributions will be lower than in the standard public good
game. When costly peer-punishment is introduced, we find that more punishment is
assigned to high contributors in the P-ACT/ANN treatment than subjects believe they
are assigning to high contributors. A regression on the reactions to punishment showed
that high contributors react adversely to receiving such punishment. Further, there
is a smaller disciplining effect of punishment of low contributors, who increase their
subsequent contribution by less than in the standard public good game.
These inefficiencies were found to be less severe in the ACT/ANN treatments compared
to when only announcements are displayed. First, we see fewer errors in the belief
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adjustment of subjects in the ACT/ANN treatments compared to those in P-ANN and
ANN. Furthermore, subjects condition their contributions more strongly on reports when
actual contribution feedback is displayed some of the time. However, in the absense
of punishment this increase in credibility does not raise contributions in ACT/ANN
relative to the ANN treatment. A possible reason is that announcements themselves are
less inflated in the ACT/ANN treatment compared to when only announcements are
displayed.
For punishment we find support for hypothesis 7 that punishment is more effective in
P-ACT/ANN than in P-ANN. However, it appears that the mechanisms behind this
effect are slightly different between the two treatments. Rather than seeing more mis-
directed punishment in P-ANN compared to P-ACT/ANN, we find an overall decrease
in punishment levels relative to the P-ACT and P-ACT/ANN treatments. In addition,
punishment does not discipline low contributors. A possible reason for the lack of ef-
fectiveness of punishment in the P-ANN treatment is that subjects can hide entirely
behind their announcements. Even if a low contributor is punished, she can adjust her
announcement instead of her contribution. If subjects anticipate the limited role of pun-
ishment in raising actual contributions, it is possible that they decide not to assign it in
the first place.
Finally, we find that a large amount of subjects overstate their actual contributions, but
that overstatements are larger when only announcements are observed. This is somewhat
surprising, since the form of monitoring employed in the treatment is very weak. Even
though actual contributions are displayed some of the time, the displayed feedback
cannot be tied to individual subjects in the experiment and we imposed no monetary
penalties for lying. While our hypotheses were specific on the effect of credibility, it is
also possible that this weak form of monitoring in the ACT/ANN treatments affected
the cost of lying or guilt aversion sensitivity parameter of the subjects. This insight
compliments work from the lying literature showing that the manner in which people
communicate affects their tendency to lie (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2010; ?; Brosig
et al., 2003b). A fruitful avenue for future research would be to analyze the effect
of different forms of monitoring and communication vehicles on lying behaviour and
subsequent public good contributions.
1.7 Conclusion
We study a public good setting in which accurate contribution feedback is not available,
but group members can send non-verifiable cheap talk messages about their contribu-
tions. It extends past work in the public good literature that relaxes the key assumption
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of accurate contribution feedback and in addition allows for communication between
group members. By studying this setting in a controlled laboratory environment, we
can explore both information transmission and reception as well as the effectiveness of
costly peer punishment.
When actual contribution feedback is given some of the time, punishment appears to
be moderately effective in terms of contributions but inefficient in terms of earnings.
The constraints on full cooperation in public good games with lying are that subjects
systematically adjust their beliefs downward for given reports, high contributors are more
likely to receive punishment and there is a decreased disciplining effect of punishment
on contributors. These results on punishment are conditional on actual contribution
information being provided some of the time. When only announcements are observed,
punishment does not discipline low contributors and is less severe than what is assigned
in the standard public good game. These findings show that the established solution
mechanism of costly peer punishment is less effective in a public good setting without
accurate contribution feedback and communication.
Chapter 2
Fooling the Nice Guys:
Explaining receiver credulity in a public
good game with lying and punishment
Joint work with Bernd Irlenbusch, University of Cologne
Abstract
We demonstrate that receiver credulity can be understood through a false consensus
effect: the likelihood with which individuals believe messages about the behaviour of
others can be explained by their own behavioural tendencies in a comparable situation.
In a laboratory experiment, subjects play a public good game with punishment in which
feedback on actual contributions is obscured. Instead, subjects communicate what they
have contributed through a post-hoc announcement mechanism. Using subjects’ social
value orientation as a proxy for their contribution tendency, we show that those high
on the measure have inflated beliefs about the contribution of others. This, in turn,
impacts their contribution and punishment decisions.
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2.1 Introduction
Deception can be described as intentionally causing another person to believe what is
false (Oxford English Dictionary, 2006). It thus involves two parties: the person doing
the deceiving (‘the sender’) and the target of the deception (‘the receiver’). Attempts
at deception are largely successful because receivers tend to believe the message of
the sender more often than they should. They are, in other words, overly credulous.
Overcredulity appears a systematic and robust phenomenon across a wide range of
settings, such as the sender-receiver game (Gneezy, 2005; Sutter, 2009; Wang et al.,
2010; Erat, 2013; Besancenot et al., 2013), trust game (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006)
and prisoner’s dilemma (Serra-Garcia et al., 2013). Furthermore, credulity persists even
under repeated play (Blume et al., 2001) and role reversal (Sheremeta and Shields,
2013). Despite this evidence, the exact drivers of receiver credulity seem to be poorly
understood.
In this paper we argue that receiver credulity (i.e. believing the messages of others)
can, in part, be explained by the individual’s own behavioural tendencies in a compara-
ble situation. Under this so-called false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977), individuals
project their own behaviour, which they deem common and appropriate, onto the be-
haviour of others1. The public good game offers an appropriate setting to evaluate this
claim, since players decide on their own contribution as well as perceive the contribution
decision of others. In addition, we can assess how subjects’ beliefs about the messages
of others influences subsequent decisions. Imagine an employee who needs to decide
how many hours to invest in a group project. The false consensus effect suggests that
someone who has a tendency to work hard herself is more likely to have the prior belief
that others in the group will do likewise. If co-workers communicate to her that they
are indeed putting in significant effort, we hypothesize that she is more likely to believe
these messages compared to someone who is less inclined to work hard2.
We study receiver credulity in a repeated public good game with lying and punishment.
In the experiment, subjects do not receive accurate contribution feedback, but instead
communicate their contribution to the others in the group through an announcement
1For a review of the false consensus effect in social psychology, see Mullen et al. (1985). For applica-
tions in economic settings, see Madara´sz (2012).
2This does not imply that other considerations are unimportant. Past work shows that receivers’ be-
liefs, on average, respond to structural factors that significantly affect the underlying deception rate. In
the setting of a trust game, receivers correctly anticipate that promises made under free format commu-
nication have a stronger impact on behaviour than predetermined messages (Charness and Dufwenberg,
2010). As such, far fewer receivers act according to the sender’s message when it has a pre-specified
structure. Sutter (2009) compares the sender-receiver game at the individual and team level and finds
that receivers are rightfully more skeptical of messages sent in a team environment. Finally, the work of
Belot et al. (2012) finds that experimental subjects largely pick up on the appropriate cues when judging
the trustworthiness of participants in a TV game show.
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mechanism. These announcements are cheap talk and subjects can lie by announcing
a lower or higher number than what they actually contributed. By eliciting subjects’
beliefs about these announcements, we can assess the degree to which individuals are
skeptical about the messages they receive and how this influences subsequent decisions.
To obtain an independent proxy of an individual’s contribution tendency, we measure
subjects’ Social Value Orientation (SVO) after the public good game. Higher scores
on the measure reflect stronger other-regarding preferences, which, in turn, are corre-
lated with higher contributions to the public good. This measure has been used in a
wide range of public good experiments, most notably Offerman et al. (1996); Sonnemans
et al. (1998); van Dijk et al. (2002), as well as other social dilemmas (see Balliet et al.
(2009) and Van Lange et al. (2007) for reviews). According to the subject’s SVO angle,
we classify them as ‘high’ or ‘low’ types. If the false consensus effect predicts receiver
credulity, we should observe that individuals who are likely to contribute to the public
good (‘high’ types) will perceive such high contributions from others in the group. Re-
versely, individuals who are not likely to contribute to the public good will perceive low
contributions from their fellow group members.
Our experimental evidence supports the false consensus effect. We find that individuals
with a high tendency to contribute to the public good (‘high types’) believe announce-
ments of others to be largely accurate, which results in inflated beliefs. These, in turn,
impact their contribution and punishment decisions, resulting in significantly lower earn-
ings compared to those low on the SVO measure. While low types adjust their beliefs
more strongly than high types, they appear well calibrated in their beliefs about actual
contributions to the public good. As such, we do not find conclusive evidence of a false
consensus effect for low types.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the experimental
design. Section 3 covers the analysis, focusing on belief formation and subsequent con-
tribution and punishment decisions. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 Method
Subjects play a 4-player repeated public good game with punishment. The game consists
of 15 periods and subjects stay in the same groups for the duration of the game (partner
matching). There are two treatments: STANDARD and ANNOUNCE. We describe
the STANDARD treatment first. At the start of each round every subject is endowed
with 20 points, which can either be kept for oneself or allocated to a group project.
Each point invested in the project is multiplied by 1.6 and split over all group members,
irrespective of contribution. After the investment decision subjects enter a feedback
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stage where they learn about the individual contributions of the others in the group.
These are displayed in random order as to prevent subjects from tracking individual
behaviour across periods. Furthermore, subjects also have the possibility to assign
punishment, for which they receive 10 additional points per period. Each point invested
in punishment reduces the earnings of the targeted subject by three points. Any points
not used for punishment are added to the subject’s individual earnings, thus making
punishment costly to administer. Each subject is consequently informed about how
many punishment points they received (if any) before starting the next period.
The payoff Πi for each subject i in each period can be expressed as follows:










where ci represents the contribution of subject i to the group project and p
i
j indicates
how much punishment subject i receives from subject j 6= i, i,j ∈ {1, ..., 4}. Subscripts
refer to the decision makers, whereas superscripts, when applicable, indicate to whom
the action is directed.
After the public good game, a second part commences in which subjects complete an
adapted version of Liebrand (1984) to measure their Social Value Orientation. In this
separate task, subjects are presented with 32 binary allocation decisions where they
divide points between themselves and a randomly selected other participant. Each of
the 32 preferred allocations can be considered as a vector, where the sum describes an
angle with the horizontal axis reflecting how much the individual cares about the payoffs
of other person. After completing these two parts, subjects provide demographics and
general comments through a questionnaire. They are then paid in private and dismissed.
In addition to the STANDARD treatment described above, we evaluate receiver credulity
in the treatment ANNOUNCE. Immediately after the actual investment decision, each
subject reports how many points they contributed to the project through an announce-
ment. Subjects are free to report any number from the strategy space and thus have
the possibility to lie by reporting a lower or higher number than what they actually
contributed. Whether and to what degree such a discrepancy exists is entirely up to
the individual subject. Importantly, these announcements are cheap talk: only the ac-
tual contribution is payoff-relevant for all players in the group. In the feedback stage,
subjects only receive information about the announced contributions of the other group
members. Since accurate feedback is not provided, we also elicit subjects’ beliefs about
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the actual contributions underlying the received announcements3. Subjects are only
informed about aggregate actual contributions and personal earnings at the end of the
experiment. All of the above is common knowledge to the subjects. In particular, it was
made clear that the information received in the feedback stage reflects the announce-
ments of the others in the group.
The two treatments were conducted over four sessions (two per treatment) with a total
of 112 undergraduate and graduate students from the University of Cologne, Germany.
This yields 14 independent observations per treatment. No subject participated in any
of the sessions more than once. The mean age of participants was 23.3 years, with
52.7 percent female. The vast majority of participants were German nationals from a
range of academic disciplines, including economics and business. Subjects were recruited
using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the experiment was programmed with the z-Tree
software (Fischbacher, 2007). Upon entering the lab, subjects were seated at individual
and visually separated computers. Before starting the experiment, written instructions
were distributed and each subject had to complete a set of control questions to ensure
understanding of the experimental procedure. At the end of the experiment the total
sum of points was converted to Euros at an exchange rate of 50 points to e 1. Each
session lasted approximately 90 minutes and participants were paid, on average, e 11
for the public good game and e 3 for the SVO elicitation.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 SVO classification and general patterns
In ANNOUNCE, the SVO angle has a Spearman rank correlation coefficient of 0.21 with
contribution decisions, which is strongly significant (p < 0.01)4. No subject was excluded
according to the inconsistency requirement of Liebrand and McClintock (1988). To
facilitate the presentation of our results, we classify subjects as either low or high types
according to their SVO degree angle, taking the 25 percent subjects with the lowest and
3Given that we are also interested in subjects’ contribution decisions, it was decided not to provide
incentives for accurate beliefs. This decision is based on work showing that incentivized belief elicitation
in repeated public good games can decrease (Croson, 2000) or increase (Ga¨chter and Renner, 2010)
contributions relative to a non-incentivized control treatment. In addition, Ga¨chter and Renner (2010)
find that the gain in accuracy from incentivized elicitation is small.
4We used the first-round contribution and the subject’s SVO degree angle to ensure independence
of observations. In STANDARD, the spearman correlation coefficient is 0.212 (p < 0.01). The mean
SVO degree angle is 8.74 (sd = 13.37) and 14.76 (sd = 18.29) for the ANNOUNCE and STANDARD
treatment, respectively.
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highest degree angles respectively5. In both treatments, a large number of subjects have
a slope of 0, indicating that they are completely individualistic. This makes it difficult to
create a clear cutoff at 25 percent of the subjects with the lowest score. For this reason
we include all subjects with a SVO degree angle of 0 and below as ‘low’ types. The high
group in ANNOUNCE (STANDARD) thus comprises of 14 (14) subjects, whereas the
low group consists of 27 (19). This corresponds to 14 and 8 independent observations in
the ANNOUNCE treatment for low and high types, respectively. For the STANDARD
treatment these numbers are 13 and 10. All reported non-parametric tests are two-tailed
and respect the independence assumptions by using averages from a group of 4 players
that interacted as one independent observation. For comparisons between types, we use
only the independent observations from those groups in which both types are present.
The general descriptive statistics in table 2.1 reveal that the two types in ANNOUNCE
differ along several dimensions. Wilcoxon signed-rank (WSR) tests confirm that high
types have significantly higher contributions (p < .012) and earn less in the public good
game (p < .012) compared to those classified as low types. Average announcements
are not significantly different between types (p = .528). In the STANDARD treatment,
differences in contributions between types are not significant.
Comparing announcements and actual contributions between types, it appears that high
types tell smaller lies than low types. While this is significant (WSR, p = .025), it
is possible that lying for the high types is limited by the experimental design, since
announcements are capped at 20. As an alternative measure, we compare the differ-
ence between the subject’s announced and actual contribution as a percentage of how
much the subject can overstate. For example, consider two individuals with an actual
contribution of 5 and 15, respectively, who both overstate this contribution by three
points. As a percentage, the first subject overstates by 3/(20 − 5) = 20% compared to
3/(20 − 15) = 60% for the second subject. Using this measure, high types overstate,
on average, by 74.13% compared to 81.03% for the low types. This difference is not
significant (MWU, p = .345). Similarly, using a measure comparing the percentage of
honest announcements between types, excluding those subjects who contributed 20, we
find that low types tell the truth 11.29% of the time, compared to 5.84% for high types.
As such, we cannot exclude a ceiling effect in explaining the difference in lying between
types.
5Our main results hold using an alternative classification according to the cooperative and individ-
ualistic types (Liebrand and McClintock, 1988). We also ran a robustness check using the SVO degree
angle, rather than the type classification, as an independent variable in the belief formation regression.
While this makes interpretation more difficult, our main results hold: announcements have a positive
effect on beliefs for those with high SVO degree angles and a negative effect for subjects with degree
angles of 0 or below. These results can be found in appendix sections B.2 and B.4.
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Table 2.1: General descriptive statistics
Average Average Average Average Average
contribution announced adjustment punishment earnings (e )
Announce (N=56)
Overall 6.79 17.14 8.40 0.14 9.71
(7.59) (4.17) (8.03) (0.64) (1.89)
Low types (n=27) 4.56 16.84 10.44 0.09 10.14
(6.62) (4.40) (8.05) (0.50) (1.80)
<∗∗ < >∗∗ < >∗∗
High types (n=14) 11.55 18.11 4.29 0.10 8.95
(7.36) (7.21) (3.73) (0.45) (1.63)
Standard (N=56)
Overall 16.43 0.26 11.00
(6.08) (1.16) (1.76)
Low types (n=19) 15.85 0.29 10.88
(6.50) (1.05) (1.77)
< > <
High types (n=14) 16.67 0.19 11.42
(6.22) (0.95) (0.93)
Standard deviations are shown in brackets. We use two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for com-
parisons between types. The ∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 5% level.
2.3.2 The effect of announcements on beliefs
Using subjects’ beliefs, we can estimate the degree to which subjects are skeptical about
the messages they receive. For example, if a subject receives an announcement of 16
and reports 10 as her belief about the underlying contribution, she adjusts her belief,
conditional on the message, by 6. In line with previous work, we find that subjects are
too credulous on average. Actual contributions are overstated by an average of 10.35
points, while subjects adjust their beliefs by 8.40 points on average. However, belief
adjustments differ significantly between types: low types adjust their beliefs downward
by an average of 10.44 points, while high types adjust by 4.29 points. This difference is
significant (WSR, p = .025)6.
6An important assumption underlying this conclusion is that each type is exposed to announcements
that are similar in both their level and their underlying accuracy. For example, if announcements
observed by high types are more truthful than those observed by low types, then high types rightfully
adjust their beliefs by less. Similarly, if low types observe a higher absolute level of announcements,
then their belief adjustment should be higher. Non-parametric tests show that observed announcements
do not differ significantly between high and low types (WSR, p = .528). The difference in the rate
with which observed announcements are truthful is weakly significant (WSR, p = .079). However, high
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Figure 2.1: Average contributions, announcements and beliefs across periods in
ANNOUNCE
Figure 2.1 depicts this difference in average credulity graphically. It maps both average
beliefs and average contributions over the fifteen periods of the game for low and high
types respectively. As a benchmark, the solid gray line represents the average actual
contribution pattern of all subjects in ANNOUNCE, whereas the dashed line reflects
overall average announcements. It is apparent from figure 2.1 that the beliefs of high
types are not an accurate reflection of actual contributions. Indeed, beliefs for the high
types are significantly above overall actual contributions (WSR, p = .036), which is
in line with the prediction of the false consensus effect. However, we do not find an
inverse relationship for the low types in that they are too skeptical about the actual
contributions in their group. As the difference between actual contributions and the
beliefs of low types is not significant (WSR, p = .272), it appears that they are, on
average, well calibrated.
We support our analysis with several censored Tobit regressions examining the effect
of announcements on belief formation. The results are presented in Table 2.2. Model
1 in Table 2.2 shows that average beliefs in the last period and subject type have a
significant impact on beliefs. By contrast, the coefficient for average announcement is not
types observe announcements that are, on average, less truthful than those observed by low types. This
strengthens the observation that high types should adjust more, rather than less.
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Table 2.2: Tobit regressions - belief formation in ANNOUNCE
Dependent variable: beliefs
Model 1 Model 2
Period number -.040 -.047
[.050] [.050]
Av. beliefs (t-1) 1.185 ∗∗∗ 1.159 ∗∗∗
[.090] [.088]
Av. announcement -.083 -.253 ∗∗
[.094] [.111]
High type 3.941 ∗∗∗ -6.555 ∗∗∗
[.873] [2.265]






Pseudo R2 (overall) .222 .226
N left-censored 151 151
N right-censored 107 107
Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and indicated in square brackets. The ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 5% and 1% level respectively. Dependent variable: Average
Beliefs: the average of the three belief measures (one for each announcement of the other group
members) in period t. Independent variables: Av. Beliefs (t-1): lagged measure of average beliefs;
Av. Announcement: average of the three announcements received by the subject on the feedback
screen in period t ; High type: binary variable, (1 = High type; 0 = Low type); High type * Av.
Announcement: the interaction between the subject’s type and the average announcement received;
Controls: include age, gender and field of study. Gender is a binary variable where 0 indicates male
and 1 female; Field of study is a binary variable where 1 is assigned to those subjects studying
economics or business and 0 otherwise. None of these controls is significant.
significant, indicating that, in general, announcements of others do not influence beliefs.
Model 2 includes the interaction term between average announcement and the subject’s
type, which is strongly significant with a positive sign. Thus, announcements positively
affect the beliefs of high types about underlying actual contributions. The coefficient
for average announcement in model 2 is significant with a negative sign, indicating that
low types decrease their beliefs in response to higher average announcements.
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2.3.3 The effect on contributions and punishment
We run various Tobit regressions to assess the role of beliefs for the contribution decision,
the results of which are included in appendix B.3. Not surprisingly, the contribution
and beliefs from the previous period are a strong predictor of the contribution in the
current period. In addition, high types also contribute significantly more than low
types, which is significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient of the interaction term
between type and average beliefs in the previous period is negative, suggesting that
beliefs inform the contribution decision to a lesser degree for high compared to low
types. However, this is not significant (p = .233). These regression results indicate that
the main difference between high and low types manifests itself at the level of belief
formation. Announcements have a positive effect on beliefs for high types while having
a negative effect for low types. However, when it comes to the actual contribution
decision, high and low types act on their beliefs in a similar way.
In addition to the contribution decision, our experimental design allows for the analysis
of punishment behaviour. Figure 2.2 displays the punishment reaction function for each
type across treatments. The bars indicate the average punishment points assigned for
each level of perceived contribution, indicated in blocks of three. Thus, the block 9-11
captures the punishment points assigned for beliefs about underlying actual contribu-
tions at 9, 10 or 11 for a given announcement. Since announcements are absent in the
STANDARD treatment, the x-axis in the right-hand panel reflects actual contributions.
The figure shows that high types administer more punishment when contributions are
(perceived to be) low. In ANNOUNCE, high types assign an average of 0.38 points when
the contribution is believed to lie between 0 and 2, compared to 0.07 points for perceived
contributions between 18 and 20. Importantly, this punishment pattern is similar in the
STANDARD treatment where credulity is not an issue7. The key insight is that in AN-
NOUNCE there are only few instances in which high types perceive actual contributions
to be low. Out of all beliefs about actual contributions that high types report, only 10.5
percent fall in the range of 0-2, while 52.1 percent are located at the other extreme of
18-20. By contrast, low types believe only 9 percent of the actual contributions to be
located in this latter range. Thus, despite the apparent willingness of high types to
punish low contributions, their biased beliefs substantially reduce punishment.
7It should be noted that the level of average punishment assigned is substantially higher in the
STANDARD treatment than in ANNOUNCE, particularly for low contributions (1.22 points and 1.39
points for contributions between 0-2 and 3-5, respectively). It is possible that uncertainty about whether
punishment is actually justified depresses average punishment in the latter treatment.
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Figure 2.2: Punishment assigned by different types in the two treatments conditional
on beliefs (ANNOUNCE) and actual contributions (STANDARD)
2.4 Conclusion
Our results show that in a symmetric setting of the public good game, an individual’s own
behavioural tendency is a useful lens to understand receiver credulity. In particular, we
find that those high on Social Value Orientation believe announcements to be accurate to
a larger extent than those low on the measure, resulting in inflated beliefs about actual
contributions. This in turn influences their contribution and punishment decisions.
The credulity of high types can thus be exploited by those subjects that contribute
low and announce high. This is reflected in their respective earnings: low types earn
significantly more than high types in ANNOUNCE, whereas no such difference exists in
the STANDARD treatment. One feature of our design is that subjects do not receive
any accurate information about actual contributions until the end of the experiment.
It would be interesting to investigate whether the credulity of high types persists when
accurate information becomes available8. For example, it might be possible for subjects
to observe actual contributions at the aggregate level or receive accurate feedback with
a certain probability. Future research can investigate whether high types only remain
credulous for as long as they remain completely unaware of the true level of actual
contributions.
8Work by Gneezy et al. (2013a) indicates that receivers who learn that they have been deceived
become less credulous.
Chapter 3
The indirect effect of monetary
incentives on deception
Abstract
This paper investigates whether working under competitive or cooperative incentives
affects deception in a subsequent, unrelated task. I use a laboratory study with two
stages. First, participants perform a real effort task under a piece rate, tournament or
team incentive. Afterwards, they play a sender-receiver game in which the sender can
gain financially at the expense of the receiver by sending a deceptive message. I find
that senders who worked under the tournament incentive are less honest than those who
worked under a piece rate. I find no increase in honesty for those who performed under
team incentives relative to the piece rate. This only holds when participants are not
informed about their relative performance during the work task. When such feedback is
provided, I find that relative performance affects honesty across all incentive conditions.
In particular, honesty decreases as relative performance differences become small.
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3.1 Introduction
Pay-for-performance schemes, such as bonuses and tournament incentives, are an im-
portant means to induce effort of agents in the workplace. However, at the same time,
there is an increasing concern that these incentive schemes motivate dishonest behaviour
by linking monetary rewards to specific performance targets. Experimental evidence
suggests that agents indeed respond to such incentives by lying about their work perfor-
mance (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013; Schweitzer et al., 2004; Cadsby et al., 2010;
Conrads et al., 2014) and cheating on a task (Pascual-Ezama et al., 2013). This paper
takes a broader perspective on the role of pay-for-performance incentives on dishonesty
by focusing on a possible indirect effect. In particular, it considers whether the kind of
work environment an agent is exposed to, as dictated by the incentive scheme, affects
dishonest behaviour in a subsequent, unrelated task. The task is unrelated in the sense
that any actions in the task have no bearing on the performance, and therefore pay level,
of the prior work environment.
It has been argued that working under competitive incentives, such as tournament
schemes, fosters an uncooperative mindset (Buser and Dreber, 2013) and a negative at-
titude towards others (Brandts et al., 2009). Other incentives, such as revenue-sharing
schemes, have been found to foster social ties (van Dijk et al., 2002) and trust (Harbring,
2010). Under optimal mechanism design, the principal cares both about the direct and
indirect effect of monetary incentives on behaviour. An indirect effect is particularly
relevant in a work environment where a subject performs multiple tasks, but receives a
pay-for-performance scheme on one of these activities (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).
Consider a salesperson who is incentivized to make sales, but also performs an auxiliary
activity, such as writing a subjective review report on customer satisfaction that is not
part of the pay-for-performance scheme. If monetary incentives in the main task influ-
ence dishonest behaviour in the auxiliary task, this can result in a loss of economic rents
to the principal. In addition, the principal may care about fostering a general attitude
of upholding ethical standards among her employees.
In a laboratory experiment, I examine the effect of cooperative and competitive incen-
tives on subsequent dishonesty. Subjects are paired and perform a real-effort task under
either a piece rate (baseline), a cooperative (team) or competitive (tournament) incen-
tive. Further, as a robustness check to the effect of incentives, participants either receive
or do not receive information about the work performance of their partner. Afterwards,
the pair plays a sender-receiver game, where the sender is informed about a true state
of the world which she then communicates to the receiver. By overstating the true state
the sender secures a financial gain at the expense of the receiver, which I use as the
measure of deception.
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I find that compared to the piece rate condition, subjects exposed to the tournament in-
centive are less honest in the subsequent task. There is no increase in honesty for those
working under team incentives compared to the piece rate. However, these incentive
effects are not robust to relative performance feedback. When subjects are informed
about the performance of their partner, honesty decreases as relative performance dif-
ferences become small. This holds across all incentive conditions. These results suggest
that even when no direct incentive for dishonesty is provided, the interaction in one’s
previous work environment can affect subsequent dishonest behaviour. In particular,
tournament incentives as well as small relative performance differences can have a neg-
ative effect on subsequent honesty.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and
hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the experimental design and procedures, followed by the
results in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses
Monetary incentives affect behaviour by changing the benefits and costs of a particular
action. Yet, there is substantial evidence from behavioural economics that monetary in-
centives affect behaviour in more indirect ways, such as by altering social norms (Gneezy
and Rustichini, 2000a), changing reputational concerns (Ariely et al., 2009), revealing
unfavourable information about the principal (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006), reducing in-
trinsic motivation for the task (Ryan and Deci, 2000) or shifting the framework of the
decision (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 1999). Through these mechanisms, studies have found
behavioural responses contrary to what a canonical cost-benefit approach would predict
when incentives are introduced in previously non-monetary contexts (Gneezy and Rus-
tichini, 2000b; Heyman and Ariely, 2004) or new monetary schemes come to replace
others (Burks et al., 2009; Meier, 2007).
A number of studies find a negative effect of competitive incentives, such as rank and
tournament schemes, on subsequent cooperation. Work by Harbring (2010) shows that
individuals who performed under a tournament incentive allocate less in a subsequent
trust game compared to those who worked under a revenue-sharing scheme. Brandts
et al. (2009) place subjects in a rivalrous task where two agents compete in order to be
selected by the principal for a lucrative work task. They find that agents who competed
hold a negative disposition towards one another as well as the principal. Finally, work
by Buser and Dreber (2013) find that individuals working under a tournament incen-
tive are less cooperative in a subsequent public good game compared to participants
who performed under a piece-rate. While the exact mechanism driving these effects is
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not immediately clear, Buser and Dreber (2013) find that their results hold even when
workers play the subsequent public good game with someone they have not interacted
with before. This results provides some evidence favouring the explanation that com-
petitive work environments foster an uncooperative mindset that affects behaviour in
subsequent, unrelated tasks.
Studies evaluating the effect of cooperative incentives, such as revenue-sharing schemes
where employees share equally in the total output generated by the group, have largely
found a positive effect on subsequent cooperation. van Dijk et al. (2002) show that
individuals are more likely to share resources with others when they have previously
interacted in a public good setting compared to a task where their payment depends
only on individual effort. Work by Pan and Houser (2013) finds that individuals who
were exposed to a work task requiring cooperation between group members showed more
trusting behaviour in a subsequent trust game, irrespective of whether the trustee was a
fellow group member or an outsider. However, the addition of a reward and punishment
mechanism (Falkinger et al., 2000) or minimum binding contributions (Reeson and Tis-
dell, 2008) to public good settings reduce contributions in groups after these incentives
are removed compared to a control group that played the public good game without
these additional incentives.
Specific to dishonesty, Gill et al. (2013) present subjects with an opportunity to lie to
obtain additional earnings after a work task with a lottery incentive. They find that
subjects exposed to the lottery are less honest than those who received a fixed wage for
their efforts. Also related is work by Cappelen et al. (2013b), who looked at the effect
of a market prime on subsequent honesty. Subjects were asked to write about a recent
experience where they bought or sold a good and then had the opportunity to behave
dishonestly in a dice-rolling game. They find a slight, but non-significant increase in
dishonesty for the market prime condition. My work differs from the design of Gill
et al. (2013) and Cappelen et al. (2013b) in its focus on competitive and cooperative
incentives. Furthermore, subjects are given actual monetary incentives rather than a
priming task.
From the lying literature, it is not immediately straightforward that honesty is subject
to such spillover effects. Previous work has shown that a majority of people experience
some psychological disutility from being dishonest (Fischbacher and Fo¨llmi-Heusi, 2013)
and that this differs across individuals (Gibson et al., 2013). In addition, individuals
are sensitive to the stake size in that they are more willing to lie when the monetary
gain of doing so increases (Gneezy, 2005; Conrads et al., 2014). In this literature, lying
behaviour is understood by the individual’s specific costs of lying as well as the partic-
ular incentives tied to the dishonest action. From this perspective, previous interaction
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is irrelevant. I use this to formulate the null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 0. Lying in the subsequent task does not differ across the incentive treat-
ments.
Alternatively, it is possible that the same mechanisms that affect subsequent coopera-
tion translate to honesty as well. Following the abovementioned literature, if tournament
incentives foster an attitude of uncooperativeness and recoil towards the work partner
and decrease trust, we can expect that subsequent honesty is negatively affected after
individuals have been exposed to such a work environment. Reversely, if team incentives
foster social ties and trust, they may positively affect subsequent honesty.
Hypothesis 1. Honesty in the subsequent task decreases for those who worked under a
tournament incentive compared to a piece rate scheme.
Hypothesis 2. Honesty in the subsequent task increases for those who worked under a
team incentive compared to a piece rate scheme.
To check for the robustness of these incentive effects, I also include treatments in which
individuals are informed about their own performance as well as that of their partner.
Checking for the effect of relative performance was deemed important, because such in-
formation is often embedded in these monetary incentive schemes (Bandiera et al., 2007,
2013). At the same time, there is some evidence that relative performance feedback en-
courages comparisons between peers, which in turn can affect subsequent cooperation
and effort provision (Larkin et al., 2012). Previous work suggests that those who out-
perform their partner may experience a sense of entitlement about their earnings (Gill
et al., 2013) or are less concerned about the welfare of others (Cappelen et al., 2013a).
Furthermore, work by Buser and Dreber (2013) finds that losing a competition as well
as a lottery has negative effects for subsequent cooperation. This evidence informs the
following null and alternative hypotheses on relative performance feedback.
Hypothesis 3a. Feedback on partner’s performance does not affect subsequent honesty
in either incentive condition.
Hypothesis 3b. Feedback on partner’s performance decreases subsequent honesty across
all incentive conditions.
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3.3 Experimental design and procedures
The experiment consists of two stages: a real effort task and a sender-receiver game with
deceptive messages. Both of these stages are played in pairs and subjects remain in the
same pair throughout the entire experiment. Decisions in the experiment are anonymous
to the other participants. Upon entering the lab, subjects are randomly assigned to a
computer at an individually separated cabin. They are given instructions and a booklet
with 15 pages of Latin text. During the first part of the experiment, the real effort task,
participants are asked to find and identify specific letters in the text using directions on
the computer screen. Each set of directions specifies the page, line, word and position
where the letter is to be found. After entering the identified letter on the computer,
directions for the next letter appear on the screen. Participants play five rounds of three
minutes each, one of which is relevant for payment. Subjects are informed about their
own performance at the end of each round, but only learn which of the five periods was
selected for payment at the end of the experiment.
After the five rounds are finished, subjects move to stage two where they play a sender-
receiver game. The sender receives information about the performance level, ranging
from 10 to 25, of a randomly selected subject from another experiment who performed a
similar work task. Upon learning about the actual performance level, the sender is asked
to send a message to the receiver about this performance level. The receiver then chooses
a number, ranging from 10 to 25, that determines payoffs for both players. Payoffs are
such that if the receiver chooses the actual performance level, the payoff allocation is
determined according to allocation X. If the number chosen by the receiver does not
match the true state, payoffs for both sender and receiver are determined according to
allocation Y. The receiver is informed about the basic structure of the game as well as
that the message and action space ranges from 10 to 25, but does not know the actual
performance level nor the exact details of the payoff allocation underlying X and Y.
After reading these general instructions for stage two, subjects are randomly assigned to
the role of sender or receiver. Senders then receive private information about the actual
performance level (12 in this experiment) and the exact payoff structure tied to the mes-
sage space. Every sender receives the same performance level as private information and
it is common knowledge that this performance level refers to that of a randomly selected
participant in another experiment. Under payoff allocation X, implemented when the
receiver chooses the actual performance level, both players receive 200 points. When
the number chosen differs from the actual performance level, the exact payoffs under
allocation Y depend on the message sent by the sender. Table 3.1 shows the message
space with the exact payoffs for this allocation, with the true state 12 in italics. The
table shows that if the sender sends the message that the performance level is 12, but
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the receiver chooses a number different from 12, payoff allocation Y gives 200 points to
both players for this particular message. If the sender decides to overstate the true state
by sending, for example, message 17 and the receiver, again, chooses a number different
from 12, then the payoffs under allocation Y are as specified under message 17, which
gives 250 points to the sender and 150 to the receiver. Thus, even if a sender believes
that the receiver will not follow her message, sending the honest message will still ensure
a payoff of 200 points to both players. Prior to sending their message, senders answer
several control questions to ensure their understanding of this payoff structure. The
message is then transmitted to the receiver, who chooses a number between 10 and 25.
Both players are then informed about their payoffs from both stages of the experiment,
paid in private and dismissed.
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix Y, effective when the receiver does not choose the actual
performance level
Message: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Sender 200 200 200 210 220 230 240 250 260 270 280 290 300 300 300 300
Receiver 200 200 200 190 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70
The second part of the experiment is a modified version of the setup of Gneezy (2005),
where the sender receives private information and can reap some personal financial gain
at the expense of the receiver by sending a message other than the true state. The
main difference with the sender-receiver game in this paper is that the payoffs tied to
the message space are such that the more the sender chooses to overstate the actual
performance level, the more she gains at the expense of the receiver. Thus, this measure
of dishonesty picks up not only whether senders are dishonest, but also the size of the
lie they choose to tell. Besides an honest message, payoff allocation Y features both
selfish black lies (message 13-22) and spiteful black lies (message 23-25). In case of the
former, the sender’s gain increases linearly by 10 currency points at the expense of the
receiver for each unit increase of the message. However, from message 22 onwards, the
sender’s gain remains constant at 300 points, but the receiver continues to lose 10 points
per unit increase of the message. These lies are spiteful, because they hurt the receiver
without benefiting the sender (Erat and Gneezy, 2012). Given evidence that individuals
in laboratory experiments are heterogeneous in their lying costs (Gibson et al., 2013),
the design used in this paper allows for a more fine-grained measure to detect changes
in lying behaviour beyond the binary outcome of honesty and dishonesty. In addition,
the discrete message and action space, coupled with the payoff structure, makes the
receiver’s choice irrelevant from the sender’s point of view. Even if the receiver decides
not to follow the message of the sender, it is very unlikely that he will choose the actual
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performance level. Moreover, since payoff allocation Y is implemented whenever the re-
ceiver chooses the wrong number, the sender’s action effectively determines the payoffs
for both parties. This addresses the potential concern that the sender chooses a different
message because she believes the receiver anticipates her to be dishonest (Sutter, 2009).
I introduce two treatment variations in a 3x2 (incentive x feedback) between-subject
design. The first varies the incentive scheme for the real effort task: a piece rate, a
revenue-sharing scheme or a tournament incentive. Under the piece rate, both players
in the pair receive individual payoffs of 30 points per correctly identified letter. In the
team condition, subjects receive 15 points for each letter they or their partner identifies
correctly. Subjects in the tournament compete for a prize of 1000 points that is awarded
to the highest performer in that round; the loser receives 0 points. At the end of the
second stage, one of the five rounds is randomly selected for payment. In the experi-
ment every 100 points equals e 1. The average performance of a pilot study was used
to set the point allocation such that average earnings would not differ across incentive
conditions. Indeed, according to two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-tests, neither average per-
formance nor average earnings from the work task differ significantly across incentive
treatments (p > 0.10).
For the second treatment variation, I run the three incentive conditions again, but now
subjects receive information about the performance of their partner during the real effort
task. Thus, in addition to knowing their own performance level, subjects are now also
informed about the performance of their partner. The rest of the experiment is identical
to the no-feedback treatment.
The sessions were conducted at the economics laboratory at the University of Cologne,
Germany, in June and October of 2013. A total of 268 undergraduate and graduate
level students from various disciplines participated in one of the six treatments. The
median age of the participants was 23 and 66% were female. The recruitment procedure
and experiment were entirely computerized using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and zTree
(Fischbacher, 2007), respectively.
3.4 Results
The main variable of interest is the message sent by the sender in stage two of the
experiment. I present the results of both the discrete (the message sent) and binary
measure (whether the sender was honest or dishonest in her message, irrespective of how
much the true performance level was overstated). The main results hold irrespective of
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the measure. Table 3.2 provides an overview of the treatments and general descriptive
statistics.
I analyze differences between treatments using non-parametric tests as well as probit and
OLS regressions. I use Mann-Whitney U-tests (MWU) for comparing differences in the
message sent and Fisher’s Exact Tests (FET) as a conservative measure for comparing
the proportion of honest senders. The latter treats honesty as a binary measure where
the sender is considered honest if the message sent was 12 and dishonest otherwise.
Unless otherwise noted, all non-parametric tests are two-sided.
Table 3.2: General descriptive statistics
Independent Av. performance Honesty (%) Av. message
observations work task sent
No feedback
Piece rate 21 10.75 47.62 16.00
(1.67) (4.74)
Team 21 11.02 38.10 17.71
(1.63) (5.03)
Tournament 21 11.30 14.29 20.57
(2.10) (4.38)
Feedback
Piece rate 23 10.54 21.74 19.50
(2.04) (4.95)
Team 24 10.23 33.33 18.08
(1.73) (5.52)
Tournament 24 10.23 33.33 18.38
(3.53) (5.23)
Standard deviations are shown in brackets. In the piece rate condition with feedback one pair could
not be formed because one of the registered subjects did not show up for the experiment.
3.4.1 Incentive effects
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of messages across the incentive conditions without and
with feedback, respectively. In general, the vast majority of messages across treatments
are either truthful (message 12) or untruthful where the sender receives the largest
financial gain without compromising efficiency (message 22). In all incentive treatments
with feedback as well as the tournament treatment without feedback, there is a relatively
large amount of senders (approximately 20%) who communicate that the performance
level is 25, where the receiver loses money without a financial gain to the sender.
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Figure 3.1: Message sent across the incentive treatments, without and with feedback
When no feedback is provided, senders in the tournament treatment are less likely to
communicate the state honestly (14.3% vs. 47.6%, FET, p = 0.04) and send a more
inflated message (20.6 vs. 16, MWU, p < 0.01) compared to those in the piece rate
condition. The distribution of messages across these treatments is also significantly
different according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p = 0.03). We find no increase in
honesty under team incentives. Compared to the piece rate, senders who performed
under the team incentive actually appear slightly less honest, although this is not sig-
nificant (38.1% vs. 47.6%, FET, p = 0.76; 17.7 vs. 16, MWU, p = 0.28). These results
only hold in the no-feedback treatment. When subjects are informed about the perfor-
mance of their partner during the work task, I find no difference in honesty levels across
incentive conditions (FET, p > 0.10, in all pairwise treatment comparisons). The role
of relative performance feedback is discussed in the next section.
Table 3.3 presents the results of various probit and OLS regressions that support the
results from the non-parametric tests. Specifically, the results show that senders who
performed the work task under a tournament incentive are 30% less likely to be honest
than those who worked under a piece rate. There is no significant effect of the incentive
when subjects are informed about their partner’s performance.
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I thus find support for hypothesis 1 on the negative effective effect of the tournament
incentive for subsequent honesty, but no evidence for hypothesis 2 on the increase in
honesty following a work environment with team incentives.
Table 3.3: Probit and OLS regressions: the effect of incentives in the work task on
subsequent honesty
Probit regression OLS regression
Dependent variable: Honest message Message sent
No Feedback Feedback No Feedback Feedback
Team -.082 .158 1.703 -.1764
[.124] [.128] [1.454] [1.567]
Tournament -.302 ∗∗ .120 4.027 ∗∗∗ -1.159
[.125] [.129] [1.473] [1.541]
Controls YES YES YES YES
N 63 71 63 71
(Pseudo) R2 .124 .070 .199 .058
Log likelihood -35.140 -40.101
The probit regression reports average marginal effects. Standard errors are shown in square brackets.
The ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable description:
Team: dummy for the team incentive treatment; Tournament: dummy for the tournament incentive
treatment; Controls: gender and a dummy for when the subject majors in economics or business.
Neither of these is significant.
3.4.2 Relative performance under feedback
From the descriptive statistics in table 3.2, it does not appear that relative performance
information has an overall negative effect on dishonesty. While honesty is lower in
the piece rate and team conditions compared to when no feedback is provided, these
differences are not significant (FET, p > 0.10). However, it is possible that there are
different effects on honesty depending on how the sender has performed relative to her
partner. Table 3.4 presents the results of various probit regressions on sender’s honesty.
For conciseness, I present the results according to the binary measure of whether the
sender was honest or dishonest in her message. The results hold when using the discrete
measure (the message sent) as the dependent variable and can be found in appendix C.1.
Relative performance (models 1a and 2a) is measured by comparing the difference in
performance level over the five rounds between the sender and the receiver. Larger
numbers correspond to larger performance differences, where the sender outperforms
or underperforms relative to the receiver by a wider margin. In the treatments where
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Table 3.4: Probit regressions: the effect of average and relative performance in the
work task on subsequent honesty
Dependent variable: Honest message
No Feedback Feedback
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Team -.077 -.064 .213 .200
[.124] [.122] [.118] [.118]
Tournament -.298 ∗∗ -.284 ∗∗ .067 .081
[.125] [.127] [.122] [.123]
Relative performance .015 .016 .083 ∗∗∗ .069 ∗∗
[.028] [.028] [.024] [.031]
Average performance -.036 -.020
[.030] [.026]
Controls YES YES YES YES
N 63 63 71 71
Pseudo R2 .127 .145 .193 .200
Log likelihood -34.990 -34.300 -34.783 -34.473
Average marginal effects reported. Standard errors are shown in square brackets. The ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
indicate significant effects at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable description: Team: dummy for
the team incentive treatment; Tournament: dummy for the tournament incentive treatment; Relative
performance: the average performance difference between the sender and their partner over the five
rounds in the work task; Average performance: the average performance of the sender over the five
rounds in the work task; Controls: gender and a dummy for when the subject majors in economics or
business. Neither of these is significant.
feedback is provided (model 2a), the variable is significant with a positive sign. This in-
dicates that honesty increases as the relative performance difference between the sender
and the receiver becomes large. This effect holds across the incentive conditions (see
appendix C.1 for these regression results). When no feedback is provided (model 1a), the
tournament incentive has a significant and negative effect on subsequent honesty. Rela-
tive performance is not significant. Taking these results together, relative performance
affects subsequent honesty only when information is provided about the performance of
the other player and this appears to dominate the effect of the incentive in the work
task.
Models 1b and 2b look at the role of absolute performance in the no-feedback and
feedback treatment. It is possible that differences in lying behaviour are driven by
inherent individual differences in skill level. If this is the case, the variable average
performance should be significant in both feedback treatments. The results in table 3.4
show that average performance is not significant in either treatment. Furthermore, when
average performance is added to the model, the effects of the tournament incentive and
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relative performance remain significant in the no-feedback and feedback treatments,
respectively.
The regressions on average and relative performance can also exclude income effects as
a driver of honesty. It is possible that subjects who perform well on the work task are
more inclined to be honest, because they have already generated substantial earnings.
Reversely, those who have earned little might be more inclined to lie to minimize in-
equality in earnings (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). If this holds, we should expect subjects
who earn little, particularly those in the tournament treatment, to lie more compared
to subjects who generated higher earnings. This is not supported by the regressions
in table 3.4, where subjects with higher average performance are not significantly more
honest than those with lower average performance. Furthermore, regressing honesty on
average earnings yields no significant coefficients for either the feedback or no-feedback
treatments. These results can be found in appendix C.1.
These results indicate that while relative performance affects subsequent honesty levels,
it does not decrease honesty per se (hypothesis 3b). Rather, senders who under- or
outperform the receiver by a small amount appear less honest than when the relative
performance difference is larger.
3.4.3 Efficiency
The tournament incentive does not appear to yield productivity gains in the work task.
Average performance does not differ significantly between the incentive treatments (see
table 3.2). In the absence of relative feedback information, subjects seem to perform
slightly better. On average participants complete six more tasks in each incentive treat-
ment compared to their feedback counterparts. These differences are not significant.
In the second stage, dishonest senders have the option to tell either a selfish black lie or
a spiteful lie. The latter hurts efficiency, because the receiver loses money without an
additional gain for the sender. Since spiteful lies are more common under the tournament
incentive, average earnings are significantly lower compared to pairs in the piece rate
treatment (MWU, p = 0.04). Again, this result only holds when no feedback is provided.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the effect of monetary incentives on deception is not
restricted to the specific task for which the incentive is designed. Even in a subsequent
task, where the original incentive is no longer relevant, the decision to deceive is driven
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by the incentive set in the work environment as well as one’s relative performance in
this environment.
I find that senders who worked under tournament incentives are less honest than those
who worked under a piece rate. Due to the higher incidence of spiteful lies, efficiency in
the second task is lowest for subjects that performed under the tournament incentive.
I find no increase in honesty for subjects who worked under team incentives compared
to the piece rate condition. This result is not robust to information about the worker’s
performance relative to their partner. When such feedback is provided, it affects hon-
esty across the incentive conditions. In particular, honesty is lower when the relative
performance difference between sender and receiver is small, compared to when the
sender under- or outperforms the receiver by a larger amount. This effect of relative
performance appears to override the individual treatment effect of the incentive scheme.
From the perspective of mechanism design, these results warrant caution in using tourna-
ment incentives as well as schemes that stress performance comparisons between peers.
Such comparisons are a particular concern for tournament incentives, which typically in-
corporate a performance ranking among employees. However, information on a worker’s
relative performance is not necessarily absent from other schemes, such as a piece rate
and team incentives.
The results on relative performance feedback suggest that subsequent honesty is affected
depending on where the individual is in the relative performance distribution. It would
be insightful to better understand whether mechanisms such as a sense of entitlement
(Cappelen et al., 2013a) or general disutility from losing the competition (Buser and
Dreber, 2013) become stronger when relative performance differences become small. In
addition, it would be interesting
Since the experiment in this paper was not specifically designed to address underlying
mechanisms, it would be insightful for future research to disentangle why tournament
incentives and relative performance information affect subsequent honesty in this way. In
particular, the results on relative performance feedback suggest that subsequent honesty
is affected depending on where the individual is in the relative performance distribution.
It would be insightful to better understand whether mechanisms such as a sense of
entitlement (Cappelen et al., 2013a) or general disutility from losing the competition
(Buser and Dreber, 2013) are stronger when relative performance differences are small.
In addition, it would be interesting to examine whether subsequent dishonesty is affected
by specific elements of the work interaction, such as the length of the work task and the
possibility for helping (Drago and Garvey, 1998) and sabotage (Harbring and Irlenbusch,
2011).
Chapter 4
Are social investments rewarded?
A Pay-What-You-Want field experiment
with Fair Trade products
Joint work with Ayelet Gneezy, University of California, San Diego
Abstract
We investigate whether the addition of a social attribute (here: Fair Trade) affects the
level of payments for products offered under Pay-What-You-Want pricing. In addition,
we evaluate whether a supplier benefits from differentiating its product offering to include
products that feature such a social attribute. In a field experiment we offer consumers
a Fair Trade chocolate product and a non-Fair Trade equivalent. The two products
are either offered separately or together. We find that when the products are offered
separately, payments for the Fair Trade product are not significantly higher than that
of the non-Fair Trade equivalent. When both products are offered, consumers are less
likely to choose the non-Fair Trade product (20%) and pay significantly less compared
to those choosing the Fair Trade alternative. By contrast, average payment levels for the
Fair Trade product are not significantly different across conditions. Thus, the difference
between the two treatments appears driven by a decrease in payments for the non-Fair
Trade product in the joint condition. We find limited support for the argument that
social preferences contribute to higher payments for the Fair Trade product.
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4.1 Introduction
One of the most successful long-running applications of Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW)
pricing is Humble Bundle, an online platform where customers can purchase a predeter-
mined bundle of videogames by individual developers across various platforms. Besides
deciding how much to pay, customers are also requested to indicate how their money
should be allocated: to Humble Bundle, to the developers and to charity. After 3 years
of operating, Humble Bundle has earned over $50 million, of which 40% was directed to
charity1. However, not all applications of PWYW pricing are equally successful. In the
same industry, individual developer Joost van Dongen launched his popular game Proun
under Pay-What-You-Want. The game was downloaded 250.000 times, collecting a mea-
gre $10.000 in payments2. This occurred despite the developer’s best efforts to promote
the PWYW pricing scheme and adding a soundtrack to the package as a bonus. In other
applications, Panera Bread’s restaurant in Portland reverted back to fixed prices after
disappointing revenues, even though branches elsewhere have been more successful3.
The observation that PWYW succeeds in some settings, but fails to be profitable in
others begs the question of what factors determine its effective application. Specifically,
little is known about what drives first, the purchase decision and second, how much
a customer will pay. One approach in the literature is that individuals with social
preferences and self-identity concerns can be motivated to pay an amount higher than
zero (Gneezy et al., 2010, 2012; Schmidt et al., 2012). In this paper, we examine whether
such motives can explain why consumers would pay more for one product than for
another. Specifically, does the addition of a social attribute to a product change purchase
behaviours under a Pay-What-You-Want pricing scheme? When the purchase of the
product affects the welfare of a third party, a consumer with self-image concerns may
choose to offer a higher payment than for a product that lacks such a social attribute.
Likewise, consumers may want to reciprocate social investments made by the supplier
via a higher payment.
We address this question using a field experiment, where consumers at a Farmer’s Market
are offered a Fair Trade product and a non-certified equivalent under Pay-What-You-
Want pricing. Besides the presence or absence of the Fair Trade label, the two products
are identical in physical appearance and taste. We use no deception in this experiment.
In a between-subject design, we offer the consumer the two products separately and
analyze the likelihood to purchase as well as the amount paid. Second, we examine
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products together. Since the two products are otherwise identical, the joint evaluation
format emphasizes the Fair Trade attribute, or lack thereof.
We find that when the products are offered separately, payments for the Fair Trade
product are not significantly higher than for the non-Fair Trade equivalent. When both
products are offered, consumers are less likely to choose the non-Fair Trade product
(20%), and those who do pay significantly less compared to those choosing the Fair Trade
alternative. The difference between the two treatments appears driven by payments for
the non-Fair Trade product. In the joint condition, these are lower compared to the
average payment when the same product is presented on its own. By contrast, average
payment levels for the Fair Trade product are not significantly different across conditions.
Thus, our evidence does not support the argument that social preferences or identity
concerns contribute to higher payments for the Fair Trade product. Rather, it appears
that the presence of the Fair Trade product decreases valuations for the non-Fair Trade
alternative relative to what customers pay for this product when it is offered on its
own. As this is work in progress, we are currently running two additional treatments
to exclude the possible confound of sorting in explaining the difference in payment in
the joint condition. Preliminary results, albeit based on a low number of observations,
suggest that the difference in payments remains when sorting is excluded.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses how the
mechanisms of social preferences and self-identity concerns affect payments and covers
previous work on purchase behaviour for products with social attributes under Pay-
What-You-Want and fixed pricing. Section 3 outlines our hypotheses. Section 4 discusses
the experimental design and substantiates our use of the Fair Trade label. The results
are presented in section 5, focusing on average amount paid and seller profits. Section
6 concludes with a discussion.
4.2 Literature review
4.2.1 Mechanisms
We briefly review the mechanisms of self-identity and social preferences and discuss their
role in driving payments under Pay-What-You-Want pricing.
The notion of self-identity assumes that individuals care about the kind of person they
consider themselves to be: their self-concept (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2011). Generally,
individuals tend to think of themselves according to certain favourable characteristics,
such as honesty, fairness and generosity. Certain behaviour is in line with the individual’s
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self-concept, such as making a donation to charity, whereas other behaviour opposes it,
such as failing to tip a waiter who has provided excellent service. Consequently, if the
individual cares about the maintenance of her positive self-image, she is deterred from
behaviours that violate her core values. The main difference with the concept of social
image is that self-image concerns can deter norm violations even when the action occurs
in private (Ariely et al., 2009).
Pay-What-You-Want incorporates self-image concerns by giving the consumer full re-
sponsibility over how much to pay for the product. Even though a payment of zero
is possible, the consumer may find it difficult to reconcile such an action with her self-
concept of being fair or generous. Thus, if a consumer feels that they are paying less than
what is fair for the product, self-image concerns might incline them to either increase
payment to a level that is closer to what they consider fair or forgo purchase altogether
(Machado and Sinha, 2013).
Social preferences, most notably (reciprocal) altruism (Andreoni, 1990) and inequality
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), can also discourage low payments under Pay-What-
You-Want. The consumer may suffer some psychological disutility from making a low
payment when the supplier has incurred a cost in offering this product. Likewise, the
Pay-What-You-Want mechanism presents an opportunity for individuals to show their
altruism by making a generous offer. According to this view, we would expect reciprocal
and altruistic consumers, as well as those experiencing advantageous inequality aversion,
to make higher payments.
4.2.2 The Pay-What-You-Want literature
In line with the mechanism of self-identity, Gneezy et al. (2010) find that the addition
of a charity component affects both average payment and purchase rate. In a large field
experiment at a theme park, adding a charity component made fewer customers buy
a souvenir photo of their ride in a roller coaster, but those that did paid significantly
more ($5.33 compared to $0.92). In follow-up experiments, Gneezy et al. (2012) find
a similar effect with souvenir photographs for a boat tour and with meal payments at
a restaurant in Vienna. Further support comes from Gravert (2013), who finds that
reminding customers in a charitable bookstore about their membership status increases
average amounts paid during a special PWYW sale.
Schmidt et al. (2012) find support for social preferences in driving PWYW payments in
a laboratory experiment. Participants who were assigned the role of buyer were willing
to pay prices significantly above the supplier’s production cost, which was common
knowledge in the experiment. In addition, buyers also paid higher amounts to sellers who
Chapter 4. Are social investments rewarded? 57
had invested in product quality, even when such an investment decision was exogeneously
imposed. Finally, Riener and Traxler (2012) study payments over a duration of two years
at a restaurant that runs exclusively on a PWYW pricing scheme. They find that above
average hours of sunshine in the autumn season significantly increased the amount paid
for the meal, even though this effect was negative in the summer season.
Other factors that have been investigated are anonymity and repeated interactions.
Gneezy et al. (2012) find that amounts paid in a Viennese restaurant are higher when
customers pay anonymously rather than engage with the waiter face-to-face. Studies at
various PWYW restaurants find that payments are stable across repeated interactions
(Kim et al., 2010; Gneezy et al., 2012; Riener and Traxler, 2012). In a laboratory study,
Schmidt et al. (2012) also find that participants are willing to support the PWYW
supplier over repeated interactions, although payments are less generous in the final
period of the game.
4.2.3 Literature on WTP and ethical consumption
Related work using the paradigm of Willingness To Pay (WTP) provides further support
for the importance of image concerns and social preferences in purchase behaviour.
In an experimental study on eBay, Elfenbein and McManus (2010) find that bids are
higher for a product where part of the payment is donated to charity compared to bids
for an identical product that lacks such a charity component. In a laboratory study,
Frackenpohl and Po¨nitzsch (2013) find that the addition of a charity donation increases
the willingness to pay for a mug compared to when this charity donation is absent. In
addition, the increase in willingness to pay for the mug with the donation exceeds the
valuation of the charity donation when this is offered on its own. Work by Friedrichsen
and Engelmann (2013) finds that participants were willing to pay more for a Fair Trade
chocolate bar when they had to announce their reservation price to the other participants
in the room compared to when they had to state their valuation privately.
Also related is the literature on ethical consumption. A number of empirical and field
experimental studies report an increase in sales upon the introduction of a Fair Trade
label on coffee (Hainmueller et al., 2014; Arnot et al., 2006), an environmental label
on apparel (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2014), canned tuna marked as ‘dolphin-free’ (Teisl
et al., 2002) and a label on cotton socks signaling good working conditions (Prasad et al.,
2004). Related work in the laboratory finds that participants assigned the role of buyer
are willing to pay more for a product to avoid imposing a negative externality on a third
party (Rode et al., 2008; Danz et al., 2012; Bartling and Weber, 2013).
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4.3 Hypotheses
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the addition of a social attribute
influences payment levels for a product. Thus, we build on the insight that self-identity
concerns and social preferences can result in above-zero payments and examine to what
extent these motivations affect the level of payment under PWYW pricing. In the
experiment, we implement this by offering consumers a regular (non-Fair Trade) product
and a Fair Trade certified equivalent.
We hypothesize that the addition of a social attribute, such as connecting a Fair Trade
label or a charity donation to the purchase of the product, can leverage self-image con-
cerns and social preferences. When a social attribute is involved, a low payment can
signal, to the individual and to others, that the consumer does not value the cause that
the attribute represents. Thus, from a self-identity perspective, frugality may be less
desirable when the consumer’s payment affects not only the seller, but also an external
third party. From the perspective of social preferences, the addition of a social attribute
can raise payments if the consumer chooses to reciprocate the supplier’s social invest-
ment. Alternatively, consumers may derive some positive utility by contributing to the
cause that the attribute represents and increase their payment accordingly.
Hypothesis 1. In the separate condition, average payment for the Fair Trade product
is higher than for the non-Fair Trade equivalent.
We use the joint evaluation format as a means to stress the social attribute of the
product. This insight draws on the literature of contextual inference (Kamenica, 2008).
When options are presented separately, each of the product attributes enter the con-
sumer’s utility function with a certain weight. However, in the absence of a reference
point some attributes are difficult to evaluate in isolation, which can lead to a poor
translation of attribute importance to value estimation (List, 2002; Hsee et al., 1999).
For example, in List (2002), a package of 13 baseball cards, of which 10 are in good con-
dition and 3 in poor condition, was deemed less attractive than a package of 10 cards in
good condition. Thus, when a comparative product is offered under joint evaluation, it
creates an explicit reference point that helps individuals compare attributes and discern
differences. This allows individuals to benchmark attributes that are difficult to evaluate
in isolation (Hsee and Leclerc, 1998; Gonza´lez-Vallejo and Moran, 2001) as well as draw
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attention to contrasting attributes (Bordalo et al., 2012; List, 2002)4. Coming back to
the study by List (2002): when the two sets of baseball cards were presented together,
consumers offered more for the package of 13 cards. In other words, individuals were
more attentive to the attribute of quantity when the package of 10 baseball cards was
presented next to a package containing 13 cards and adjusted their bids accordingly.
Two key differences between work in this literature and the present study is that our
experiment features a product with a social attribute, as opposed to a self-interested
feature, such as quantity or quality of the product. A possible critique is that a social
attribute is more ambiguous as to its desirability. Some individuals might perceive the
social attribute as negative, whereas others might be indifferent to the cause it represents.
While this a valid critique, we believe the Fair Trade label is overall a desirable attribute,
given that it enjoys wide consumer support and sales revenues are rapidly increasing in
the United States and other key markets (Fair Trade Labeling Organization, 2012).
A second important difference with previous work is that the social attribute is not
explicitly featured on both products. While the Fair Trade chocolate cupcake is marked
as ‘Fair Trade’, the alternative is simply marked as a ‘chocolate cupcake’. In other words,
the latter is not labelled as ‘non-Fair Trade’, which makes the social attribute silent for
the regular product when it is offered on its own. However, this only strengthens our
argument that the joint presentation format will draw attention to the social attribute.
Rather than the attribute being difficult to evaluate under separate evaluation, it is
likely that the Fair Trade attribute is not taken into consideration at all when the
regular product is presented on its own.
In the joint condition of the experiment we present the Fair Trade product alongside a
non-Fair Trade equivalent. Since the two products are similar on all other observable di-
mensions such as physical appearance (shape, size and color) as well as taste, we expect
the attribute of Fair Trade to be salient. We hypothesize that this salience can affect
valuations in two ways. First, drawing attention to the Fair Trade attribute might raise
4Hsee et al. (1999) provide support for benchmarking under joint evaluation in the following exper-
iment. Participants are given a hypothetical hiring decision, where they have to make a salary offer to
a job candidate for the position of programmer. The first candidate, J, has a 3.0 GPA and has written
70 KY programs in the last two years. The other candidate, S, has a GPA of 4.9 and has written 10
KY programs in the same time span. While important, the attribute of programming experience is not
informative in isolation, since it is difficult to evaluate whether writing 10 or 70 KY programs is a low
or high number. Under separate evaluation, the authors find that participants offered a higher salary
to candidate S, but made a higher offer to candidate J when the two candidates were evaluated side by
side. Similar results were obtained by Hsee and Leclerc (1998) and Gonza´lez-Vallejo and Moran (2001)
using other hypothetical scenarios. In support of attribute salience, Okada (2005) offers participants a
$50 grocery or dinner certificate as a reward for their participation in a study. Of those presented the
two options separately, only 23.8% of subjects preferred the grocery certificate over the dinner option.
However, under joint evaluation, 56% selected the grocery certificate. Okada argues that the attribute
contrasting the two options, which she describes as the tradeoff between ‘utilitarian/hedonic’ properties,
is made salient under joint evaluation. This in turn makes individuals opt for a product that is useful
as opposed to just pleasurable.
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the average amount paid for the Fair Trade product through either mechanism specified
above. If this manipulation is successful, we should see an increase in amount paid for
the Fair Trade product under joint evaluation compared to when this product is offered
separately. Second, it is possible that the presence of the Fair Trade product conveys
information to the consumer that the regular product is ‘non-Fair Trade’. Even though
the regular product lacks a label, the attribute of ‘non-Fair Trade’ might not enter the
utility function of most consumers when the product is presented on its own. Therefore,
if the joint presentation makes clear that the regular product lacks the social attribute,
we can expect payments for this product to decrease relative to the average amount paid
in the separate condition.
Hypothesis 2. In the joint condition, average payments for the Fair Trade product are
higher than for the non-Fair Trade equivalent.
Hypothesis 2a. In the joint condition, average payments for the Fair Trade product
increase relative to those in the separate condition.
Hypothesis 2b. In the joint condition, average payments for the non-Fair Trade prod-
uct decrease relative to those in the separate condition.
4.4 Experimental procedures
4.4.1 The Fair Trade label
Fair Trade certification represents a number of initiatives to alleviate poverty in devel-
oping countries by directing part of the proceeds to the farmers that grow the respective
products. The label guarantees the farmers a minimum floor price for their output (or
the market price if this is higher), ensures a safe work environment, freedom of associa-
tion and the prohibition of child and forced labor. This is funded via a price premium
(typically 20%) attached to products carrying the Fair Trade label (Fair Trade Labeling
Organization, 2012). The collected premia are allocated via a democratic decision pro-
cedure to various social and business development projects in the community, including
scholarships, leadership training and school building and renovation (Fair Trade USA,
2014). Different from a charity contribution, the Fair Trade label represents a market-
based approach to alleviate poverty in developing countries. Individuals can voluntarily
contribute to the cause through their consumption decisions by choosing to purchase
the labelled product.
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By sales volume, the main product categories that carry the Fair Trade label are flowers
and plants, bananas, sugar and coffee (roasted, instant and raw cacao beans). Prod-
ucts are sold in over 125 countries worldwide with total sales revenues exceeding $6.4
billion in 2012 (Fair Trade Labeling Organization, 2013). The largest markets are the
United States, the United Kingdom and various countries in continental Europe such as
Germany. In the United States, sales revenue has rapidly increased from $289 million
in 2004 to nearly $1.4 billion in 2011 (Fair Trade Labeling Organization, 2005, 2012).
However, Fair Trade consumption still accounts for less than 1% of total grocery market
sales in the United States (Food Marketing Institute, 2014).
The Fair Trade label is particularly well suited to examine the role of social preferences
and self-identity concerns in purchase behaviour. A useful feature is that the label refers
exclusively to improving working conditions for farmers in developing countries. It does
not impose quality standards on the product nor does it concern itself with the use
of pesticides or treatment of livestock. Thus, in contrast to certified organic produce,
there are no personal health or nutritional reasons to prefer Fair Trade over a regular
alternative. Assuming that consumers understand the meaning of the Fair Trade label,
the two products should be considered equivalent in terms of consumption value. There
is some support for this assumption. A study by Lotz et al. (2013) does not find a
difference in ex ante beliefs about taste for Fair Trade and non-Fair Trade chocolate
among consumers in Germany.
4.4.2 General procedures
We run a field experiment at various Farmer’s markets in the San Diego area between
February and June 2014. A Farmer’s Market is a weekly event where local vendors
offer their products, typically produce, baked goods and crafts. There are a total of 53
Farmer’s Markets organized every week across the San Diego area and are typically 4-5
hours in length. We operated a stand at 5 different markets (North Park, Pacific Beach,
La Jolla, University Heights and Hillcrest) for a maximum of 4 occasions each. In total,
we were at the Farmer’s Market for 14 days generating 219 unique sales.
At the market we operate our own stand where we sell our product (chocolate cupcakes)
exclusively under Pay-What-You-Want pricing. This avoids reputation issues with re-
peated customers as well as potential contagion from the sale of other products. The
stand was framed by a large banner that read ‘Delicious Cupcakes, Pay What You Want’
but did not specify our treatment conditions.
Our product offering consists of two products: a regular chocolate cupcake and a Fair-
Trade certified equivalent. Both products are identical in physical appearance (see
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appendix D.1 for a graphical representation) and were presented to the customer on
the stand display with signs indicating the respective product. We denoted the regu-
lar chocolate cupcake as ‘Chocolate Cupcake’ and the Fair Trade equivalent as a ‘Fair
Trade Chocolate Cupcake’. Besides several display items, the cupcakes were individually
boxed and labelled with a sticker indicating which of the two products was purchased
(Figure 4.1 and 4.2). The Fair Trade sticker featured the official Fair Trade logo used in
the United States. The sticker for the regular product featured an image of a cupcake.
We made the signage and stickers as identical as possible in terms of style, but different
with respect to content. Customers were limited to one cupcake per person.
The experiment uses no deception whatsoever. The Fair Trade cupcakes we offered
were indeed distinct from the regular cupcakes in that they are made using Fair Trade
certified cacao powder. This was arranged via a special order to a small local bakery in
the San Diego area. We paid $1.75 and $2.10 for each regular and Fair Trade chocolate
cupcake, respectively.
chocolate
Figure 4.1: Sticker for the reg-
ular (non-Fair Trade) product
Figure 4.2: Sticker for the Fair
Trade certified product
For each purchase, we record the amount paid by the customer. We also document the
observable demographics of gender, age and ethnicity to the best of our abilities. In
addition, we recorded the time of purchase as well as whether the customer was alone or
accompanied by a group and whether this group contained any young children. Finally,
we also counted the number of passerbys every thirty minutes to calculate the overall
purchase rate.
4.4.3 Treatments and randomization
Once customers approached the stand they were exposed to our different treatment con-
ditions: the regular cupcake is presented separately (SEP REG), the Fair Trade cupcake
is presented separately (SEP FT) or a joint condition where the regular and Fair Trade
cupcake are offered together (JOINT). We randomized at the market level, changing
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conditions every 7 sales5, which implied changing the display with the appropriate signs
and a slight change in the script to inform the customer what we were offering. Each
market was exposed to all treatment conditions at least once. In advance, we created
a random series of the treatment conditions for each market (see appendix D.2 for de-
tails) that dictated the order in which conditions would change. In case the Farmer’s
Market ended before we were able to conclude a treatment, we would continue with this
condition upon our next visit at that particular market.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Checking randomization
We collected 219 unique sales over 5 markets. The proportion of conditions in each
market are not significantly different according to a Chi-square test, χ2 (6, N = 212)
= 8.82, p = 0.18. However, this result is conditional on excluding the data from the
University Heights market (n = 7). Due to practical limitations, we were only able to
operate a stand at University Heights for 1 day. It turned out that this market as a whole
was doing poorly and was terminated the following week. Since the number of sales at
this market were low we were only able to effectively run the SEP FT and JOINT
conditions. In the following analyses we still include the sales data from University
Heights. However, all the results we report are robust when the observations from this
market are excluded.
The conditions also appear balanced in terms of demographics of the customer, which
are displayed in appendix D.3. There are no significant differences in observed gender,
ethnicity, age and group size between the separate regular, separate Fair Trade and joint
(overall) treatments. However, within the joint treatment the proportion of women
choosing the regular product in the joint condition is significantly lower than those
choosing the Fair Trade equivalent (Fisher’s Exact Test, p = 0.029).
4.5.2 Profile of the customer
Of those that could be classified according to observable demographics, consumers pur-
chasing our product are predominately female (62.9%) with a mean age in the high
30s. The vast majority of purchasers are Caucasian (79.2%), with Asian and African
5During our first visit at each market, we randomized every 5 sales to ensure that we would be able
to run all conditions on the first day. This was to address a possible ’first day’ effect, where consumers
are more likely to approach the stand because it is new at the market. During each consecutive visit,
we randomized every 7 sales.
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Americans being the next two largest ethnic categories (7% and 3%, respectively). Ap-
proximately 60% of customers purchase the product on their own, whereas slightly more
than 32% come in pairs. The remaining 8% are in groups larger than two people. Ap-
proximately 11% of customers were accompanied by one or more young children.
4.5.3 Amount paid
Figure 4.3 presents the average amount paid by condition. The joint condition is broken
up by the type of product (regular or Fair Trade) chosen by the customer. A total of
14 customers, approximately 17% of consumers in the joint condition, chose the regular

















































Figure 4.3: Average amount paid by condition
When the two products are presented separately, customers pay an average of $2.35 for
the regular chocolate cupcake and $2.44 for the Fair Trade equivalent. These amounts
are not different according to a standard t-test (MSEP−REG = 2.35 vs. MSEP−FT=
2.44, t(136) = -.351, p = .726) and Mann-Whitney U-test (p = .867). Moreover, the
distribution of payments between these two treatments is not significant according to a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p = .988). These results indicate that customers do not pay
more for a product with a Fair Trade label compared to a non-certified equivalent when
the two are presented separately. Thus, we do not find support for hypothesis 1.
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In the joint condition, the relative difference between the two products becomes sig-
nificant. Customers who choose the regular product pay an average of $1.26 for the
regular chocolate cupcake and $2.70 for the Fair Trade alternative. These differences
are strongly significant according to a t-test (MJOINT−REG = 1.26 vs. MJOINT−FT=
2.70, t(79) = -3.705, p < .001) and Mann-Whitney U-test (p < .001). Comparing pay-
ments for each of the products in the joint condition to those in the separate condition,
we find that the difference appears to be driven by regular product. For the Fair Trade
product, payments in the joint condition ($2.70) rise slightly compared to the sepa-
rate presentation ($2.44). However, this difference in the amount paid is not significant
(MWU, p = .246). Payments for the regular product in the joint condition are signific-
natly below those in the separate condition (MSEP−REG = 2.35 vs. MJOINT−REG=
1.26, t(86) = 3.205, p = .002) and Mann-Whitney U-test (p < .001). Furthermore,
under joint evaluation, nearly 80% of customers who choose the regular cupcake pay $1.
In the separate condition only 21% of customers pay this amount for the same product.
These distributions are significantly different according to a Kolmogorov Smirnov test
(p < .001).
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Table 4.1: OLS regression: Drivers of the amount paid
Dependent variable: Amount paid
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Separate - Fair Trade .084 .0783 .230 .396
[.243] [.257] [.321] [.438]
Joint - Regular -1.093 ∗∗∗ -1.075 ∗∗∗ -1.105 ∗∗∗ -1.274 ∗∗∗
[.224] [.224] [.328] [.394]
Joint - Fair Trade .343 .348 .441 .337
[.226] [.230] [.269] [.342]
Pacific Beach .165 -.359 -.721
[.252] [.388] [.731]
La Jolla .081 -.381 -.475
[.239] [.356] [.460]
University Heights .333 -.210 -.030
[.651] [.754] [.928]
Hillcrest .244 -.306 -.155
[.323] [.408] [.643]




Age category .662 ∗∗ .598
[.310] [.388]






Constant 2.226 ∗∗∗ 2.042 ∗∗∗ 2.628 ∗∗∗
[.214] [.626] [.837]
RA controls NO NO NO YES
N 219 219 177 141
R2 .057 .061 .105 .139
All models have robust standard errors for independent purchases and are shown in square brackets.
The ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significant effects at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Models 3
and 4 exclude observations where the customer could not be classified according to one or all of
the demographic variables included in the model. Variable description: Separate - Fair Trade /
Joint - Regular / Joint - Fair Trade: dummy for the respective treatment; Pacific Beach / La Jolla
/ University Heights / Hillcrest: dummy for the respective market; Market session: the occasion
number that our stand operated at the market; Gender: the gender of the customer; Age category /
Age category2: an ordinal variable of age at 10 year intervals. Higher numbers indicate higher age;
Ethnic majority: dummy with a value of 1 if the customer is Caucasian and 0 otherwise; Group size:
the number of individuals in the group; RA controls: Includes dummies for the research assistant(s)
operating the stand. For the coefficients of these controls, see appendix D.5.
We complement this non-parametric analysis with various OLS regressions, the results
of which are shown in table 4.1. The dummy for the joint condition with the regular
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product choice is strongly significant and negative compared to when the regular product
is offered on its own. Specifically, moving from the separate regular to the joint regular
condition lowers payments by $1.09 - $1.27, depending on the model. This is a decrease of
approximately 50% compared to what is paid for this product in the separate condition.
Differences between the separate regular condition and the other treatments are not
significant. Models 2 - 4 include various control variables, such as dummies for each
of the markets, the number of occasions our stand was present at the market, the
research assistant as well as various observable demographics of the purchaser. None of
these controls except age is significant. In particular, we find a inverted-u relationship
between age and amount paid, where young and very old customers pay less than those
of middle age. However, this effect is not entirely robust in model 4 which includes all
the controls.
These results support hypothesis 2: in the joint condition, consumers pay more for the
Fair Trade product compared to the non-Fair Trade equivalent. Conditional on product
choice, this difference appears to be driven by payments for the non-Fair Trade product
decreasing relative to those in the separate condition, which supports hypothesis 2b.
Average payments for the Fair Trade product do not appear to increase in the joint
condition compared to amounts paid for this product when it is presented on its own.
4.5.4 Purchase rates
Another indicator of purchase behaviour is the purchase rate. We take the count of the
passerbys for each market to calculate overall traffic over each thirty minute interval.
Using the recorded times of purchase, we can calculate the amount of purchases per
condition for every half hour we were present at the market. Since both traffic and
amount sold can differ substantially by market session, we average the total number of
purchases and traffic numbers by condition for each market session.
Purchase rates for the separate conditions are 2.42% for the regular product and 3.74%
for the Fair Trade alternative. This difference is weakly significant (MWU, p = .08). At a
rate of 1.46%, the amount of customers purchasing in the joint condition is substantially
lower. This is significant compared to both separate conditions (MWU, both p < .01).
An OLS regression with controls, the results of which are included in appendix D.5,
confirm these results. In the regression, the dummies for the La Jolla and Hillcrest
markets are significant and negative, indicating that purchase rates in these markets,
irrespective of the treatment, are lower compared to the benchmark of the North Park
market. A possible explanation is that there is more competition at the La Jolla and
Hillcrest markets. Since these are among the largest markets in San Diego, there are more
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vendors offering similar kinds of products. In addition, stand space at these markets
is in high demand, which could imply that only very successful vendors are stationed
there.
4.5.5 Profits
Table 4.2: Marginal and estimated average profit (per 10.000 traffic) per condition
Separate Separate Joint Joint Joint
Regular Fair Trade Regular Fair Trade Overall
Marginal revenue $2.35 $2.44 $1.26 $2.70 $2.45
Marginal costs $1.75 $2.10 $1.75 $2.10 $2.04
Marginal profit $0.60 $0.34 $-0.49 $0.60 $0.41
Average revenue $570.20 $911.58 $31.77 $325.22 $274.50
Average costs $423.77 $785.11 $44.07 $253.16 $217.02
Average profit $146.44 $126.47 $-12.30 $72.06 $57.48
Finally, to determine whether offering the Fair Trade product is a sensible strategy,
we evaluate the profitability of each of the different product offerings. The top rows
of table 4.2 display marginal profits for the regular and Fair Trade product across the
separate and joint conditions. Even though marginal revenue for the two products
is similar under separate evaluation, the Fair Trade product comes with higher costs.
We paid $2.10 for each Fair Trade cupcake and $1.75 for the non-Fair Trade alternative.
Thus, under separate evaluation, marginal profits of $0.60 for the non-Fair Trade product
are markedly higher than the $0.34 profit for each Fair Trade cupcake. When the two
products are offered together, marginal profits for the Fair Trade product increase to
$0.60. For the regular product, marginal profits are negative at $0.49 per cupcake.
Thus, in terms of marginal profits the Fair Trade cupcake does better when the product
is presented alongside a non-certified equivalent. However, marginal profit is not higher
compared to that of the regular cupcake when this is presented on its own.
One caveat to this analysis is that the purchase rates for the joint condition are signifi-
cantly lower compared to both separate conditions. Taking into account these purchase
rates, we can estimate average overall profits for every 10.000 passerbys of traffic (bottom
rows of table 4.2). Overall, estimated profits are highest for the non-certified product
when it is offered on its own, generating $146.44 compared to $126.47 for the Fair Trade
cupcake. While marginal profits for the Fair Trade product under joint evaluation are
higher than in the separate condition, the low purchase rate depresses overall profits
to slightly over $72. Based on these estimates, the supplier would maximize profits by
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offering the non-certified product on its own. However, conditional on differentiating,
offering the Fair Trade product generates higher profits.
These conclusions are of course conditional on the marginal cost difference for each of
the products. It is possible that overall profits for the Fair Trade product in the separate
condition can do better than the non-certified equivalent if the seller is able to acquire
the Fair Trade ingredients at a lower cost. In our study we paid a mark-up of 20% for
the Fair Trade product. If this would drop to 16.6% (a $0.06 reduction) the estimated
profit for the Fair Trade product per 10.000 passerbys would match that of the regular
product when this is offered on its own.
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
In a field experiment we offer consumers a Fair Trade and non-Fair Trade product
under a Pay-What-You-Want pricing scheme. Under joint evaluation, the consumers
who choose the non-Fair Trade product pay significantly less than those choosing the
Fair Trade equivalent. However, we find no such difference when the two products
are offered separately. This evidence does not support that social preferences or self-
identity concerns contribute to higher payments for the Fair Trade product. Under
social preferences, we would expect customers to pay more for the Fair Trade product
if they desire to reciprocate the supplier’s social investment or if the customer derives
some positive utility from contributing to a better existence for coffee bean farmers.
Individuals with self-identity concerns would choose to pay more for the Fair Trade
product if they maintain themselves as individuals who are fair and care for the well-
being of a third party. However, customers do not pay more for the Fair Trade product
when this is offered on its own. Furthermore, under joint evaluation, there is no increase
in payments for the Fair Trade product in the joint condition compared to what is paid
when the product is presented separately. Our interpretation of this result is that the
presence of the Fair Trade product in the joint evaluation format depresses valuations
for the non-certified option. Whereas under separate evaluation the consumer purchases
a ‘chocolate cupcake’, in the joint condition this product is now explicitly ‘non-Fair
Trade’. Thus, when the two products are offered together, it becomes clear that the
regular product lacks the social attribute, which depresses valuations. This results in
a significant difference in payments for the two products and an increase in marginal
profits for the Fair Trade product. However, overall profits are highest when the non-Fair
Trade product is offered on its own.
These results warrant caution in attributing the success of the Fair Trade label to so-
cial preferences and/or self-identity concerns. This explanation is in line with findings
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from several studies in the ethical consumption literature. Work by Teisl et al. (2002)
finds that the increased demand for dolphin-free tuna in supermarkets came largely
from consumers substituting away from non-labelled alternatives. In a controlled field
experiment, Hainmueller et al. (2014) find a similar substitution effect for Fair Trade
coffee. While the introduction of Fair Trade labelled coffee increased demand by 10%,
this was offset by a reduction of 9% in demand for non-labelled coffee. Our results
suggest that such a substitution effect might be driven by the joint evaluation format,
where the introduction of a Fair Trade product decreases valuations for the non-certified
alternative.
This conclusion is subject to an important caveat, namely that sorting poses a viable
alternative explanation for our results. Contrary to the separate treatments, the joint
evaluation format presents consumers with a choice between the Fair Trade and non-Fair
Trade product. It is possible that payments for the non-Fair Trade product are lower
in this condition, simply because individuals with a low valuation sort into buying this
product, whereas consumers with a high valuation opt for the Fair Trade alternative.
This would imply that valuations for the two products are actually consistent with what
we obtained in the separate treatments, but that the possibility to sort into different
products results in different averages in the joint condition. However, it is unclear a
priori on what grounds consumers with high valuations are expected to sort into buying
either product. For example, it is not necessarily obvious that consumers who value the
Fair Trade attribute necessarily have a higher valuation of the overall product. Indeed,
our data shows that a substantial portion of consumers (17.9%) who choose the Fair
Trade product pay $1 or less, implying that not all consumers who pay little self-select
into the non-Fair Trade product. Still, it is important to address this possible confound
to support our argument that valuations for the non-Fair Trade product decrease in the
joint condition. We do this by running two additional treatments, which are scheduled to
finish by November 2014. These treatments are identical to the two separate conditions,
where consumers are presented either the Fair-Trade chocolate cupcake or the non-Fair
Trade alternative. However, when we introduce customers to our product offering, we
include the statement that “Usually we also have (Fair Trade) chocolate cupcakes, but
these are unavailable today”. We thus make consumers aware that an alternative exists,
but do not actually give the consumer the option to choose this product. If we still see
a decrease in payments for the non-Fair Trade product in this condition, we can exclude
sorting as a possible confound6.
6Preliminary results, based on 7 unique sales per condition, suggest an effect in this direction. When
the non-Fair Trade product is offered on its own but consumers are made aware that a Fair Trade
alternative is usually available, consumers pay an average of $1.62 (sd = 1.06). For the Fair Trade
treatment average payments are $3.07 (sd = 1.88).
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A.1 Additional regression results
Table A.1: Tobit regression: the effect of beliefs on the contribution decision across
treatments
Dependent variable: Contribution
Model 1 Model 2
Period number -.180 ∗∗∗ -.176 ∗∗∗
[.053] [.049]
Average beliefs (t− 1) 1.479 ∗∗∗ 1.914 ∗∗∗
[.114] [.334]
P-ACT/ANN -4.312 ∗∗ 3.062
[1.689] [5.179]
P-ANN -9.881 ∗∗∗ -1.989
[1.662] [5.277]
NoP-ACT/ANN -7.132 ∗∗∗ -2.617
[1.986] [5.246]
NoP-ANN -11.441 ∗∗∗ -1.759
[2.181] [5.572]
P-ACT/ANN *Av. beliefs (t− 1) -.469
[.378]
P-ANN *Av. beliefs (t− 1) -.520
[.360]
NoP-ACT/ANN *Av. beliefs (t− 1) .002
[.383]








Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and indicated in square brackets.
The ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Variable description: Period number : the period number; Average beliefs (t-1) : the sum of
beliefs about the actual contribution of each of the group members in the previous period;
P-ACT/ANN : dummy that takes the value 1 when the treatment is P-ACT/ANN and 0
otherwise; P-ANN : dummy that takes the value 1 when the treatment is P-ANN and 0
otherwise; NoP-ACT/ANN : dummy that takes the value 1 when the treatment is NoP-
ACT/ANN and 0 otherwise; NoP-ANN : dummy that takes the value 1 when the treatment
is NoP-ANN and 0 otherwise.
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Table A.2: Tobit regression: the role of lies on punishment assigned
Dependent variable: Punishment assigned
P-ACT/ANN P-ANN
Period number -.038 -.138 ∗∗
[.052] [.066]
Deviation .296 ∗∗∗ .322 ∗∗∗
[.086] [.112]
Perceived liar (dummy) .665 .317
[.886] [1.230]
Size of the lie -.130 -.223
[.080] [.140]






Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and indicated in square brackets.
The ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Variable description: Deviation : how much the target’s contribution deviates from the
social optimum of 20 points; Perceived liar : a dummy with a value of 1 when the target’s
contribution is believed not to coincide with the made announcement; and 0 when the target
is believed to be honest; Size of the lie : the discrepancy between the target’s displayed
contribution and the subject’s beliefs about the actual contribution of the target.
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A.2 Instructions public good game (P-ACT/ANN treat-
ment)
The instructions below are for the P-ACT/ANN treatment (announcements are displayed
50% probability and participants can administer costly peer punishment) and are trans-
lated from the original German. Instructions for the other treatments (in English and
German) are available upon request.
General instructions
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. In this experiment you can earn
money depending on your own decisions and those of other participants. How you can
earn money will be made clear to you in the following instructions. Please read these
carefully.
During the experiment communicating with other participants is not permitted. Not
following these rules results in the termination of the experiment and all payments.
When you have questions, please raise your hand out of the cabin. A member of the
student team will come to you and answer your question in private.
During the experiment your earnings are calculated in points. The total number of
points you earn will be converted to Euro at the following exchange rate:
50 points = e 1
The e 2.50, which you received for showing up to this experiment, are converted into
points. This means you start the experiment with 125 points.
The converted amount in Euros are paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
The payment will happen anonymously, meaning that no participant will know how
much other participants were paid. All decisions during the experiment are also made
anonymously, meaning that no participant will find out the identity of those behind the
decisions made.
The Experiment
The experiment lasts a total of 15 periods. In each of these 15 periods, you are in a
group with three other participants. The group composition stays the same during the
whole duration of the experiment. You thus play with the same three participants in a
group during all 15 periods. Every period is divided into two phases.
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Contribution Phase
At the start of each period, each participant receives 20 points. We refer to these points
as ‘endowment’. In the first phase you need to decide how many of these 20 points you
want to contribute to a group project and how many you would like to keep for yourself.
Every point that you keep for yourself increases your earnings by 1 point. Every point
that you contribute to the project increases your own earnings by (0.4 * 1 =) 0.4 points
and also raises the earnings of each of your group members by 0.4 points. Likewise,
every point that other group members contribute to the group project increases your
earnings by 0.4 points. Imagine that all group members together contributed 60 points.
In this case each group member receives (0.4 * 60 =) 24 points from the project. If
the sum of all contributions is 9 points, then each group member receives (0.4 * 9 =)
3.6 points from the project. Earnings are determined in the same way for every group
member. This means that every group member receives the same share from the group
project.
Your earnings in this phase can be calculated using the following formula:
Earnings = (Endowment – Your contribution) + (0,4 * Sum of all
contributions)
Imagine that every group member contributed 10 points to the project. This means that
you keep (20 - 10 =) 10 points for yourself. The sum of all contributions in the group
is (10 + 10 + 10 + 10 =) 40 points. As such you earn (0.4 * 40 =) 16 points from the
project. Your total earnings in this period are (10 + 16 =) 26 points.
After each period you receive information about the contributions of the other group
members. However, in this experiment you cannot observe the contribution decision of
your fellow group members. Likewise, other group members cannot observe your contri-
bution decision. For this reason, after each group member has made their contribution
decision, you can announce your contribution to the others in your group. The amount
that you decide to announce is at your discretion.
After all group members have made their decisions, you receive information about the
contributions of your fellow group members in the previous period. The computer ran-
domly selects either your actual contribution or your announcement is displayed on the
feedback screen. With 50% probability your actual contribution will be displayed and
with 50% probability your announced contribution will be displayed. The displayed
contribution is determined in this way for each group member. As such it is possible in
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any given round that, for example, the announced contribution of the first group mem-
ber and the actual contribution of the second and third group members is displayed.
For this reason, we also ask you for your beliefs about the actual contribution of each
group member.
The table below shows a screenshot of the feedback screen in a given period:
Please note that the order in which group members are displayed is reshuﬄed each
round.
To summarize, in the contribution phase you make two decisions about your contri-
bution: the first decision about how many points you contribute to the project. And
second, a decision about how many points you announce to your fellow group members
about your contribution. All group members make their decisions simultaneously. This
means that no one is informed about the decisions of the others before making his or her
own decision. On the feedback screen you will informed about the actual or announced
contributions of your fellow group members and will be asked to state your beliefs about
their actual contribution. Please note: even though your announced contribution can
be displayed as feedback, only the actual contribution decision influences your earnings.
Reduction Phase
In the last column of the above table on the feedback screen you have the possibility to
assign reduction points to your fellow group members. This will be explained below.
In the reduction phase you receive 10 additional points. Every group member now has to
decide, whether to reduce the earnings of the others by assigning reduction points or to
leave earnings unchanged. Your fellow group members can thus have the possibility to
reduce your earnings if they want. In this phase, all decisions are made simultaneously.
Every reduction point that you assign to a group member reduces the earnings of this
participant by 3 points. Please note that – even in the case of a loss - you will receive
at least e 2.50 for your participation at the end of the experiment.
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When you do not want to change the earnings of your fellow group members, then you
do not assign any reduction points. The points that you do not assign to reductions are
added to your personal earnings. For example, when you assign two reduction points,
a total of (10 - 2 =) 8 points are added to your personal earnings. In other words,
assigning reduction points to your fellow group members is costly to you.
Imagine that you assign 3 reduction points to group member 1 (this reduces the earnings
of group member 1 by 9 points) and 0 reduction points to group member 2 and 3 (this
does not change the earnings of group member 2 and 3). After all group members have
made their decisions, you learn that the other group members assigned you a total of
2 reduction points. This means, that your personal earnings are reduced by (2 * 3 =)
6 points, while the (10 - 3 =) 7 reduction points you did not assign are added to your
personal earnings.
When you assign reduction points, you need to indicate to which group member you
assign these. Because the announced contributions of the group members are anonymous
and displayed in random order, you can indicate the number of points you want to assign
in the corresponding row on the feedback screen. Given that you have a total of 10
reduction points, the maximum you can assign is 10 points.
Please note that you do not learn the individual reduction decisions of your fellow group
members. This means that you receive information about how many reduction points
you received in total, but not how many points each group member separately assigned
to you. Further, you only learn about how many reduction points you received and not
how many points other group members received. After you receive this information, the
next period begins.
Earnings formula and example

















Contribution Phase Reduction Phase
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Your earnings in each period can be calculated using the following formula. When you
have questions about this, please notify us.
Earnings = (Endowment – Your contribution) + (0,4 * Sum of all
contributions) + (10 - Reduction points assigned by you) - (3 * Total
reduction points assigned to you)
This formula shows that your earnings consist of four parts:
1. The points that you decide to keep for yourself: (Endowment – Your contribution)
2. The points from the project, which is 40% of the sum of all contributions.
3. The points that you do not assign as reduction points: (10 – Reduction points
assigned by you).
4. The reduction points assigned to you multiplied by a factor 3.
Example (the numbers in this example were determined randomly)
Imagine that you and every other group member contributed 5 points to the project.
This means that you keep (20 - 5 =) 15 points for yourself. The sum of all contributions
in the group is (5 + 5 + 5 + 5 = ) 20 points. Therefore you receive (0.4 * 20 =) 8
points from the project. In the reduction phase you decide to assign 1 reduction point
to another group member, which reduces the earnings of this participant by (1 * 3 =) 3
points. From the 10 reduction points that you could assign, you have (10 - 1 =) 9 points
left over. These are added to your personal earnings. You receive 2 reduction points
from the other group members, which reduces your earnings by (2*3 =) 6 points.
Your earnings in this period are:












Important: Even though your announced contribution is shown on the feedback screen,
only your actual contribution decision influences your payoffs.
When you have read and understood these instructions, please complete the practice
questions on your screen. These are meant to familiarize you with the decision proce-
dures. When all participants have answered all practice questions correctly, the experi-
ment begins.
Thank you for participating.
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B.1 The 32 allocation decision tasks of the ring measure
(Liebrand, 1984)
Option A Option B
You Other You Other
1 0 +500 +304 +397
2 +304 +397 +354 +354
3 +354 +354 +397 +304
4 +397 +304 +433 +250
5 +433 +250 +462 +191
6 +462 +191 +483 +129
7 +483 +129 +496 +65
8 +496 +65 +500 0
9 +500 0 +496 -65
10 +496 -65 +483 -129
11 +483 -129 +462 -191
12 +462 -191 +433 -250
13 +433 -250 +397 -304
14 +397 -304 +354 -354
15 +354 -354 +304 -397
16 +304 -397 0 -500
17 0 -500 -304 -397
18 -304 -397 -354 -354
19 -354 -354 -397 -304
20 -397 -304 -433 -250
21 -433 -250 -462 -191
22 -462 -191 -483 -129
23 -483 -129 -496 -65
24 -496 -65 -500 0
25 -500 0 -496 +65
26 -496 +65 -483 +129
27 -483 +129 -462 +191
28 -462 +191 -433 +250
29 -433 +250 -397 +304
30 -397 +304 -354 +354
31 -354 +354 -304 +397
32 -304 +397 0 +500
Table B.1: The 32 allocation decision tasks comprising the ring measure (Liebrand,
1984)
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B.2 SVO angles and corresponding classifications based on
our 25% and Liebrand and McClintock (1988)
Classification
SVO degree Frequency L& McC 25%
-3.73 1 Individualistic Low
-1.33 1 Individualistic Low
-0.81 1 Individualistic Low
0.00 24 Individualistic Low
0.36 1 Individualistic NA
2.32 1 Individualistic NA
3.73 6 Individualistic NA
7.43 1 Individualistic NA
7.48 1 Individualistic NA
10.66 1 Individualistic NA
11.18 1 Individualistic NA
11.35 1 Individualistic NA
14.54 1 Individualistic NA
14.58 1 Individualistic NA
14.96 1 Individualistic High
18.55 1 Individualistic High
18.72 1 Individualistic High
22.46 1 Individualistic High
22.48 1 Individualistic High
22.51 1 Cooperative High
23.44 1 Cooperative High
24.07 1 Cooperative High
26.23 1 Cooperative High
26.28 1 Cooperative High
37.51 1 Cooperative High
55.33 1 Cooperative High
57.96 1 Cooperative High
N=56. Mean=8.74. Classification: individualistic (n=48), cooperative (n=8), low (n=27),
high (n=14). An individual is classified as individualistic if her SVO angle lies between -22.5
and 22.5 degrees. Subjects in the range of 22.5 and 65.7 degrees are classified as cooperative.
Those with degrees lower than -22.5 are classified as competitive, while those higher than
65.7 degrees are altruists. The table below includes the SVO degree angles of all subjects
as well as the corresponding classification according to Liebrand and McClintock (1988) and
our 25% categorization (25%).
Table B.2: SVO angles of all experimental subjects and corresponding classifications
based on our 25% and Liebrand and McClintock (1988)
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B.3 Tobit regression: Drivers of the contribution decision
As stated in the main text, the contribution and average beliefs in the previous pe-
riod are a significant predictor of the contribution in the current period. Subjects also
contribute more when they are a high type compared to a low type. Importantly, the
interaction term between type and the lagged measure of average beliefs is not signifi-
cant. This indicates that types do not differ in the degree to which beliefs inform their
contribution decision.
Dependent variable: Contribution
Model 1 Model 2
Period number -.091 -.066
[.122] [.129]
Contribution (t-1) 1.002 ∗∗∗ 1.002 ∗∗∗
[.185] [.187]
Av. beliefs (t-1) .527 ∗∗∗ .624 ∗∗∗
[.103] [.145]
High type 4.201 ∗∗∗ 6.855 ∗∗∗
[.999] [2.673]
High type * Av. beliefs (t-1) -.239
[.200]




Pseudo R2 (overall) .198 .199
N left-censored 243 243
N right-censored 96 96
Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and indicated in square brackets. The ∗∗∗
indicate significant effects at the 1% level. Dependent variable: Contribution: the subject’s contri-
bution to the public good. Independent variables: Period number: the period number; Contribution
(t-1): lagged measure of contribution; Av. Beliefs (t-1): lagged measure of average beliefs. High
type: binary variable, where 1 indicates that the subject is classified as a high type and 0 when she
is a low type; High type * Av. Beliefs (t-1): captures the interaction between the subject’s type
and lagged average beliefs; Controls: include age, gender and field of study. Gender is a binary
variable where 0 indicates male and 1 female; Field of study is a binary variable where 1 is assigned
to those subjects studying economics or business and 0 otherwise. None of these is significant.
Table B.3: Tobit regression: Drivers of the contribution decision
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B.4 Robustness checks
B.4.1 Analysis according to classification of cooperative and individ-
ualistic types
We can repeat our analysis using an alternative classification according to cooperative
and individualistic types (Liebrand and McClintock, 1988). Even though the differ-
ences between types become more pronounced than those obtained through the 25%-
classification, we fail to reach strong significant results because of a low number of
independent observations. The 8 subjects classified as cooperative types are spread over
6 different groups, which gives us 6 independent observations for the non-parametric
tests. Compared to those classified as individualistic, cooperative types contribute more
and discount less, and these differences are weakly significant (WSR, p = 0.074 for both).
In a regression on belief formation using this classification, the interaction term between
type and announcement remains positive and strongly significant (p = 0.01).
Average Average Average Average
contribution belief adjustment punishment
Overall (N=56) 6.79 8.74 8.40 0.14
(7.59) (7.51) (8.09) (0.64)
Individualistic (n=48) 6.00 7.74 9.16 0.16
(7.36) (7.24) (8.14) (0.68)
Cooperative (n=8) 11.50 14.71 3.85 0.03
(7.24) (6.18) (5.45) (0.20)
Standard deviations are show in brackets.
Table B.4: General descriptive statistics for alternative classification
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B.4.2 SVO degree angle as an independent variable in the belief for-
mation regression
Our main results hold when we replace the type classification in the belief formation
regression with the SVO degree angle. In Model 2, average announcement is significant
and has a negative coefficient. Combining this with the interaction term, announcements
have a negative impact on beliefs for those with a SVO degree angle of 0 (ie. completely
individualistic). The impact of average announcement on beliefs becomes positive for
subjects with a SVO degree angle of approximately 10 and higher.
Dependent variable: Average beliefs
Model 1 Model 2
Period number -.023 -.028
[.045] [.046]
Av. beliefs (t-1) 1.224 ∗∗∗ 1.196 ∗∗∗
[.107] [.114]
Av. announcement -.036 -.201 ∗∗
[.079] [.099]
SVO degree angle .118 ∗∗∗ -2.71 ∗∗
[.037] [.126]
SVO degree angle * Av. announcement .022 ∗∗∗
[.008]
Constant -2.717 ∗∗ .424
[1.285] [1.749]
N 784 784
Pseudo R2 (overall) .227 .230
N left-censored 209 209
N right-censored 136 136
Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level and indicated in square brackets. The ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Dependent variable: Average
beliefs: the average of the three belief measures (one for each announcement of the other group
members) in period t. Independent variables: Period number: the period number; Av. Beliefs
(t-1): lagged measure of average beliefs; Av. announcement: average of the three announcements
received by the subject on the feedback screen in period t; SVO degree angle: the subject’s SVO
degree angle; SVO degree angle * Av. Announcement: the interaction between the subject’s SVO
degree angle and the average announcement received.
Table B.5: Tobit regression: the effect of the SVO degree angle on belief formation
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B.5 Instructions public good game (ANNOUNCE treat-
ment)
The instructions below are for the ANNOUNCE treatment and are translated from the
original German. Instructions for the other treatments (in English and German) are
available upon request.
General instructions
You are now participating in a scientific experiment. In this experiment you can earn
money depending on your own decisions and those of other participants. How you can
earn money will be made clear to you in the following instructions. Please read these
carefully.
During the experiment communicating with other participants is not permitted. Not
following these rules results in the termination of the experiment and all payments.
When you have questions, please raise your hand out of the cabin. A member of the
student team will come to you and answer your question in private.
During the experiment your earnings are calculated in points. The total number of
points you earn will be converted to Euro at the following exchange rate:
50 points = e 1
The e 2.50, which you received for showing up to this experiment, are converted into
points. This means you start the experiment with 125 points.
The converted amount in Euros are paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
The payment will happen anonymously, meaning that no participant will know how
much other participants were paid. All decisions during the experiment are also made
anonymously, meaning that no participant will find out the identity of those behind the
decisions made.
The Experiment
The experiment lasts a total of 15 periods. In each of these 15 periods, you are in a
group with three other participants. The group composition stays the same during the
whole duration of the experiment. You thus play with the same three participants in a
group during all 15 periods. Every period is divided into two phases.
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Contribution Phase
At the start of each period, each participant receives 20 points. We refer to these points
as ‘endowment’. In the first phase you need to decide how many of these 20 points you
want to contribute to a group project and how many you would like to keep for yourself.
Every point that you keep for yourself increases your earnings by 1 point. Every point
that you contribute to the project increases your own earnings by (0.4 * 1 =) 0.4 points
and also raises the earnings of each of your group members by 0.4 points. Likewise,
every point that other group members contribute to the group project increases your
earnings by 0.4 points. Imagine that all group members together contributed 60 points.
In this case each group member receives (0.4 * 60 =) 24 points from the project. If
the sum of all contributions is 9 points, then each group member receives (0.4 * 9 =)
3.6 points from the project. Earnings are determined in the same way for every group
member. This means that every group member receives the same share from the group
project.
Your earnings in this phase can be calculated using the following formula:
Earnings = (Endowment – Your contribution) + (0,4 * Sum of all
contributions)
Imagine that every group member contributed 10 points to the project. This means that
you keep (20 - 10 =) 10 points for yourself. The sum of all contributions in the group
is (10 + 10 + 10 + 10 =) 40 points. As such you earn (0.4 * 40 =) 16 points from the
project. Your total earnings in this period are (10 + 16 =) 26 points.
After each period you receive information about the contributions of the other group
members. However, in this experiment you cannot observe the contribution decision of
your fellow group members. Likewise, other group members cannot observe your contri-
bution decision. For this reason, after each group member has made their contribution
decision, you can announce your contribution to the others in your group. The amount
that you decide to announce is at your discretion.
After all group members have made their decisions, you receive information about the
announced contributions of your fellow group members in the previous period. In ad-
dition, we ask for your beliefs about the underlying actual contribution of each of your
group members.
The table below shows a screenshot of the feedback screen in a given period:
Please note that the order in which group members are displayed is reshuﬄed each
round.
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To summarize, in the contribution phase you make two decisions about your contri-
bution: the first decision about how many points you contribute to the project. And
second, a decision about how many points you announce to your fellow group members
about your contribution. All group members make their decisions simultaneously. This
means that no one is informed about the decisions of the others before making his or her
own decision. Please note: even though your announced contribution will be displayed
as feedback, only the actual contribution decision influences your earnings.
Reduction Phase
In the last column of the above table on the feedback screen you have the possibility to
assign reduction points to your fellow group members. This will be explained below.
In the reduction phase you receive 10 additional points. Every group member now has to
decide, whether to reduce the earnings of the others by assigning reduction points or to
leave earnings unchanged. Your fellow group members can thus have the possibility to
reduce your earnings if they want. In this phase, all decisions are made simultaneously.
Every reduction point that you assign to a group member reduces the earnings of this
participant by 3 points. Please note that – even in the case of a loss - you will receive
at least e 2.50 for your participation at the end of the experiment.
When you do not want to change the earnings of your fellow group members, then you
do not assign any reduction points. The points that you do not assign to reductions are
added to your personal earnings. For example, when you assign two reduction points,
a total of (10 - 2 =) 8 points are added to your personal earnings. In other words,
assigning reduction points to your fellow group members is costly to you.
Imagine that you assign 3 reduction points to group member 1 (this reduces the earnings
of group member 1 by 9 points) and 0 reduction points to group member 2 and 3 (this
does not change the earnings of group member 2 and 3). After all group members have
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made their decisions, you learn that the other group members assigned you a total of
2 reduction points. This means, that your personal earnings are reduced by (2 * 3 =)
6 points, while the (10 - 3 =) 7 reduction points you did not assign are added to your
personal earnings.
When you assign reduction points, you need to indicate to which group member you
assign these. Because the announced contributions of the group members are anonymous
and displayed in random order, you can indicate the number of points you want to assign
in the corresponding row on the feedback screen. Given that you have a total of 10
reduction points, the maximum you can assign is 10 points.
Please note that you do not learn the individual reduction decisions of your fellow group
members. This means that you receive information about how many reduction points
you received in total, but not how many points each group member separately assigned
to you. Further, you only learn about how many reduction points you received and not
how many points other group members received. After you receive this information, the
next period begins.
Earnings formula and example

















Contribution Phase Reduction Phase
Your earnings in each period can be calculated using the following formula. When you
have questions about this, please notify us.
Earnings = (Endowment – Your contribution) + (0,4 * Sum of all
contributions) + (10 - Reduction points assigned by you) - (3 * Total
reduction points assigned to you)
This formula shows that your earnings consist of four parts:
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1. The points that you decide to keep for yourself: (Endowment – Your contribution)
2. The points from the project, which is 40% of the sum of all contributions.
3. The points that you do not assign as reduction points: (10 – Reduction points
assigned by you).
4. The reduction points assigned to you multiplied by a factor 3.
Example (the numbers in this example were determined randomly)
Imagine that you and every other group member contributed 5 points to the project.
This means that you keep (20 - 5 =) 15 points for yourself. The sum of all contributions
in the group is (5 + 5 + 5 + 5 = ) 20 points. Therefore you receive (0.4 * 20 =) 8
points from the project. In the reduction phase you decide to assign 1 reduction point
to another group member, which reduces the earnings of this participant by (1 * 3 =) 3
points. From the 10 reduction points that you could assign, you have (10 - 1 =) 9 points
left over. These are added to your personal earnings. You receive 2 reduction points
from the other group members, which reduces your earnings by (2*3 =) 6 points.
Your earnings in this period are:












Important: Even though your announced contribution is shown on the feedback screen,
only your actual contribution decision influences your payoffs.
When you have read and understood these instructions, please complete the practice
questions on your screen. These are meant to familiarize you with the decision proce-
dures. When all participants have answered all practice questions correctly, the experi-
ment begins.
Thank you for participating.
B.6 Instructions ring measure, translated from the origi-
nal German
In the upcoming task we ask you to make several allocation decisions. For this you are
paired with another randomly selected participant. Through the allocation decisions
you and this participant can earn points. In each allocation you must repeatedly choose
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between two allocations X and Y (for example, allocation X: 10 points for you and 12
points for the other or allocation Y: 8 points for you and 20 points for the other). The
points that you allocate to yourself are converted to Euros at an exchange rate of 500
points = e 1, and paid to you at the end of the experiment. As a randomly selected
participant is connected to you for this task, likewise are you paired with a randomly
selected participant. Through the allocation decisions of this participant, he or she
allocates points to you. This means that the participant to whom you allocate points
is a different person from the one who allocates points to you. The points that this
participant allocates to you are added to your earnings and are also paid to you at the
end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 500 points = e 1.
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C.1 Additional regression results
Table C.1: OLS regressions: the effect of average and relative performance in the
work task on the message sent
Dependent variable: Message sent
No Feedback Feedback
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Team 1.672 1.616 -2.098 -1.583
[1.471] [1.459] [1.514] [1.533]
Tournament 4.009 ∗∗∗ 3.870 ∗∗ -.422 -1.000
[1.487] [1.485] [1.512] [1.507]
Relative performance -.082 -.788 ∗∗
[.320] [.318]
Average performance .306 .516 ∗∗
[.336] [.252]
Constant 18.392 ∗∗∗ 14.822 ∗∗∗ 21.016 ∗∗∗ 13.891 ∗∗∗
[1.909] [4.118] [1.698] [2.813]
Controls YES YES YES YES
N 63 63 71 71
R2 .200 .210 .141 .115
Standard errors are shown in square brackets. The ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 5% and
1% level, respectively. Variable description: Team: dummy for the team incentive treatment; Tourna-
ment: dummy for the tournament incentive treatment; Relative performance: the average performance
difference between the sender and receiver over the five rounds of the work task; Average performance:
the average performance of the sender over the five rounds of the work task; Controls: gender and a
dummy for when the subject majors in economics or business. Neither of these is significant.
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Table C.2: Probit regression: the effect of relative performance on honesty across
incentive conditions
Dependent variable: Honest message
Feedback





Relative performance .083 ∗∗∗ .137 ∗∗
[.024] [.067]
Team * Rel. performance -.106
[.091]




Pseudo R2 .193 .210
Log likelihood -34.783 -34.043
Average marginal effects reported. Standard errors are shown in square brackets. The
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Variable
description: Team: dummy for the team incentive treatment; Tournament: dummy
for the tournament incentive treatment; Relative performance: the average perfor-
mance difference between the sender and receiver over the five rounds of the work
task; Team/Tourn. * Rel. performance: the interaction term between the treat-
ment dummy and relative performance; Controls: gender and a dummy for when the
subject majors in economics or business. Neither of these is significant.
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Table C.3: Probit regression: the effect of average earnings on honesty across incentive
conditions




Tournament -.264 ∗∗ .174
[.118] [.151]




Pseudo R2 .158 .085
Log likelihood -33.761 -39.435
Average marginal effects reported. Standard errors are shown in square brackets. The
∗∗ indicate significant effects at the 5% level. Variable description: Team: dummy
for the team incentive treatment; Tournament: dummy for the tournament incentive
treatment; Average earnings: the average earnings of the sender in the five rounds
of the work task; Controls: gender and a dummy for when the subject majors in
economics or business. Neither of these is significant.
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C.2 Experimental instructions
The instructions below are for the tournament treatment with feedback and were trans-
lated from the original German. In the experiment, the instructions for part 2 were
only handed out to participants once part 1 was concluded. Instructions for the other
treatments (in English and German) as well as the booklet with Latin text are available
upon request.
C.2.1 Instructions
Please read these instructions carefully. You can earn money depending on the de-
cisions made by you and the other participants in this experiment. When you have
questions, please raise your hand and a research assistant will answer your question
privately. Throughout the entire experiment you make decisions anonymously: no par-
ticipant knows the identity of the other the participants.
In this experiment you earn points. When the experiment is over you will receive e 1
for every 100 points earned. This payment and the additional e 2.5 that you receive
for arriving to the experiment on time are paid immediately and anonymously after the
experiment ends.
The experiment consists of two parts.
C.2.2 Part 1
Pairs and periods
• You are randomly matched with another participant in this experiment. This will
not change in the course of the experiment.
• This part consists of five rounds of three minutes each.
Task
• In each round you are given a series of tasks with directions to find a letter in the
booklet in front of you. The directions indicate the page, line number, word and
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position where the letter can be found. All letters of the alphabet are possible,
but spaces and punctuation marks, such as commas and full stops, should not be
counted. Note that the line number is indicated at the left margin of the page.
• Type the found letter in the text box on the screen and press ‘OK’ to move to the
next task with directions for a new letter.
Information
• A task is correctly solved when the right letter is identified. However, you are only
informed about the number of correctly solved tasks at the end of each period.
This means that while the round is in progress, you are not informed whether the
letter you entered is correct or not.
• A timer in the top right corner of the screen counts down from three minutes.
You can continue working for as long as you have time remaining. When the three
minutes are over, you move to the feedback screen. Here you learn how many tasks
you solved correctly as well as how many were solved by the participant matched
to you.
Payment
• Payment depends on your performance as well as the performance of the other
participant.
• In each round, the participant who solved the most tasks correctly receives 1000
points. The other participant receives 0 points. Note that a task in only correctly
solved when the correct letter has been identified.
• After all five rounds are finished, one round will be randomly selected for payment.
However, you will only be informed which round was selected when the experiment
is concluded.
• Example: Assume that round 4 is randomly selected for payment. In this round,
you correctly solved 5 tasks and the other participant solved 3. Since your perfor-
mance is higher, you earn 1000 points and the other participant earns 0 points.
Practice round
• You start with a practice round to familiarize yourself with the task of part 1. Any
earned points in this round do not count towards your final payoffs.
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• The practice round lasts 3 minutes. If you wish, you can finish the round early
by clicking the ‘SKIP’ button. However, you will still need to wait for all other
participants to finish their practice round before the experiment continues. This
‘SKIP’ option is not available during the actual five rounds of the experiment.
C.2.3 Part 2
Pairs
• In part 2 you are matched with another participant. This is the same person you
were matched with in part 1.
• There are two roles: player A and player B. At the start of part 2 one participant
in the pair is randomly assigned the role of player A. The other participant is
assigned the role of player B.
Decision
• In a previous session, participants completed a task similar to part 1 of this exper-
iment. In this previous session, performance levels ranged from 10 to 25 completed
tasks. We randomly selected a performance level from one participant in a ran-
domly selected round from this experiment.
• Player A will be informed about this performance level. Player B will not know
it.
• Player A is asked to send a message to player B. Player A can freely choose from
the following messages:
Message: “The performance level was 10” Message: “The performance level was 18”
Message: “The performance level was 11” Message: “The performance level was 19”
Message: “The performance level was 12” Message: “The performance level was 20”
Message: “The performance level was 13” Message: “The performance level was 21”
Message: “The performance level was 14” Message: “The performance level was 22”
Message: “The performance level was 15” Message: “The performance level was 23”
Message: “The performance level was 16” Message: “The performance level was 24”
Message: “The performance level was 17” Message: “The performance level was 25”
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• Player B receives the message sent by player A and then chooses a number between
10 and 25.
Payment
• There are two different payment options, option X and Y. Each option allocates
a certain number of points to player A and a certain number of points to player
B. In addition, the message that player A chooses to send determines the point
allocation of payment option Y.
• The decision of player B determines which payment option is implemented.
– If player B chooses a number that contains the actual performance level,
player A and B are paid according to option X.
– If player B chooses a number that differs from the actual performance level,
player A and B are paid according to option Y.
Information
• Player A is informed about the actual performance level from the randomly selected
participant from the previous experiment. Player B is not informed about this.
• Player A is informed about the particular point values of payment options X and
Y. Player B does not receive information about these values.
• Player A and B are informed about their earnings from part 2 at the end of the
experiment.
C.2.4 Private instructions for player A in part 2
Important: Additional instructions player A!
In a previous session, participants completed a task similar to part 1 of this experiment.
In this previous session, performance levels ranged from 10 to 25 correctly solved tasks.
We randomly selected a performance level from one participant in a randomly selected
round from this participant. The actual performance of the participant from the pre-
vious session in the experiment is ‘12’. The other participant does not know that the
performance level is 12.
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We now ask you to send a message to player B. Depending on the number chosen by the
receiver, payoff allocation X or Y is implemented, which allocates a specific number of
points to you and the other participant. Only you are informed about the point values
of this payment option. Player B is not informed about this. The message that you
choose will be sent to player B. Player B then chooses a number and this determines the
payoffs for both you and the other participant.
If player B chooses a number that contains the actual performance level, then you and
player B are paid according to option X. This means that you earn 200 points and player
B also earns 200 points.
If player B chooses a number than differs from the actual performance level, then you
and player B are paid according to option Y. The specific point values for Y are as
follows:
• If you send message “the performance level was 10”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 200 points and player B receives 200 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 11”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 200 points and player B receives 200 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 12”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 200 points and player B receives 200 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 13”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 210 points and player B receives 190 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 14”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 220 points and player B receives 180 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 15”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 230 points and player B receives 170 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 16”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 240 points and player B receives 160 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 17”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 250 points and player B receives 150 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 18”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 260 points and player B receives 140 points.
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• If you send message “the performance level was 19”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 270 points and player B receives 130 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 20”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 280 points and player B receives 120 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 21”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 290 points and player B receives 110 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 22”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 300 points and player B receives 100 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 23”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 300 points and player B receives 90 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 24”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 300 points and player B receives 80 points.
• If you send message “the performance level was 25”, and player B chooses a number
different from 12, then you receive 300 points and player B receives 70 points.
Please answer the following questions to ensure your understanding of the above infor-
mation.
Question 1: If you send the message “The performance level was 12” and player B chooses
number 12, then the payoffs are:
(a) You: 0 points; Player B: 0 points
(b) You: 200 points; Player B: 200 points
(c) You: 230 points; Player B: 170 points
(d) You: 170 points; Player B: 230 points
Question 2: If you send the message “The performance level was 15” and player B chooses
number 15, then the payoffs are:
(a) You: 0 points; Player B: 0 points
(b) You: 200 points; Player B: 200 points
(c) You: 230 points; Player B: 170 points
(d) You: 170 points; Player B: 230 points
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D.1 Photos of stand materials
Figure D.1: Stand display, sep-
arate Fair Trade condition
Figure D.2: Stand display, sep-
arate regular condition
Figure D.3: Detail of product
and sign, separate regular condi-
tion
Figure D.4: The stand from
a distance with banner and re-
search assistant
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D.2 Randomization
Table D.1: Overview of dates and randomization for each market
Market Dates Randomization
North Park 13/02, Thursday R → FT → J → J → R
20/02, Thursday
Pacific Beach 18/02, Tuesday R → FT → J → J → R →
25/02, Tuesday FT → R → FT
04/03, Tuesday
La Jolla 23/02, Sunday R → J → FT → J → R →
16/03, Sunday FT → FT → J
30/03, Sunday
27/04, Sunday
University Heights 19/04, Saturday FT → J
Hillcrest 04/05, Sunday J → FT → R → J →
11/04, Sunday R → FT → R → J → FTn →
25/05, Sunday Rn → J
01/06, Sunday
Abbreviations for conditions are as follows. R: separate regular;FT: separate Fair Trade; J: joint;
FTn: joint, but regular unavailable (new treatment); Rn: joint, but Fair Trade unavailable (new
treatment).
Table D.1 displays the order of treatments we ran at each market. The first two columns
list the respective market and the dates we operated a stand there. In advance, we
generated a random series of the treatments for each market. In Pacific Beach, for
example, this series turned out to be ‘Separate regular’, followed by ‘Separate Fair
Trade’, then ‘Joint’, then ‘Joint’ again, then ‘Separate regular’, then ‘Separate Fair
Trade’ and so forth. We changed condition every 5 sales on the first day at the market,
and then every 7 sales on subsequent visits to that market.
Table D.2 lists various observable demographics of the purchaser across the different
conditions and product choices. Note that the number of observations is lower than our
full sample. Practical limitations, such as one customer interaction quickly followed by
another, inhibited us from recording all observable demographics. However, this affected
all treatments equally.
We use non-parametric tests to evaluate whether customers across the treatment condi-
tions differ in terms of the recorded demographics. For age and group size a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests shows no significant differences between the separate regular, separate Fair
Trade and joint conditions at the 10% level. For gender, we find no significant differences
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using a test of equality of proportions, again at the 10% level or stronger. For ethnicity,
the consumers purchasing Fair Trade in the separate condition are more likely to be
Caucasian than not (91.1%) compared to consumers in the separate regular condition
(72.5%) (equality of proportions test, p = 0.02). Finally, within the joint treatment,
a larger proportion of those purchasing Fair Trade are female than those choosing the
regular product (equality of proportions test, p < 0.01).
Table D.2: Demographics of purchaser by condition
Separate Joint
Regular Fair Trade Regular Fair Trade Overall
n = 60 n = 49 n = 12 n = 52 n = 74
Sex (% female) 56.7% 67.3% 25.0% 67.9% 60.3%
Ethnicity 72.5% 91.1% 66.7% 82.7% 79.7%
(% Caucasian)
Av. age category 3.43 4.20 3.78 3.88 3.85
(1.48) (1.57) (1.47) (1.76) (1.42)
Av. group size 1.53 1.53 1.42 1.27 1.30
(0.81) (0.63) (0.79) (0.45) (0.52)
Standard deviations are shown in brackets
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D.3 Details of the markets
Table D.3: General descriptive statistics by market
Sex Av. age Ethnicity Av. amount Av.
(% female) category (% Cauc.) paid traffic
North Park (n = 46) 61.1 20-30 66.7 $2.29 755
(1.26)
Pacific Beach (n = 61) 56.8 40-50 82.1 $2.41 903
(1.30)
La Jolla (n = 61) 64.8 40-50 89.8 $2.36 1452
(1.27)
Univ. Heights (n = 7) 42.9 40-50 85.7 $2.71 NA
(1.70)
Hillcrest (n = 44) 69.0 30-40 77.6 $2.51 1367
(1.79)
Overall (N = 219) 62.3 30-40 80.2 $2.41 1166
Standard deviations are shown in brackets
Table D.4: Purchase rates and total traffic by market
North Park Pacific Beach La Jolla Hillcrest Overall
Separate regular 2.53% 3.71% 1.23% 1.53% 2.25%
Separate Fair Trade 6.25% 3.51% 2.07% 3.08% 3.73%
Joint 3.34% 2.37% 0.88% 0.92% 1.88%
Total traffic 1509 2710 4356 5468 14043
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D.4 Script
The script was provided to the research assistants at the Farmer’s Market to ensure con-
sistency in their interaction with the customer. It was emphasized that the wording to
explain the product offering, the Pay-What-You-Want pricing mechanism and the mean-
ing of the Fair Trade label had to be strictly adhered to. However, they were allowed to
make additional statements if they felt this would help their interaction with the cus-
tomer. Research assistants were only sparsely informed about the purpose of the study
and what we were doing with the proceeds. This made their answer of “I don’t know” to
certain questions, such as cost structure, legitimate.
D.4.1 Main interaction
• Hello. Are you interested in a chocolate cupcake?
• We have a chocolate cupcake. (SEP REG)
• We have a Fair Trade certified chocolate cupcake. (SEP FT)
• We have a chocolate cupcake and a Fair Trade certified chocolate cupcake. (JOINT)
• We have a chocolate cupcake. Usually we also sell Fair Trade certified ones, but
these are not available today. (Rn)
• We have a Fair Trade certified chocolate cupcake. Usually we also sell regular
chocolate ones, but these are not available today. (FTn)
• Today we have a Pay-What-You-Want offer. It means you can take a cupcake and
choose how much to pay for it.
• Thank you for stopping by. Have a nice day.
D.4.2 Suggested answers to questions from customers
• What does Pay-What-You-Want mean? It means you can choose how much to
pay for a cupcake. This means you get to choose the price and that any price you
choose to pay is acceptable.
• Does this mean I can pay anything I want? Yes, you are in control, so you can
choose how much you want to pay.
• Can I get the product for free? If you decide to pay $0, then yes, you can get it
for free.
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• Is $1/$2/$3/$4/$5 ok? However much you want to pay is ok.
• How much do other people pay? / What is the average that people have paid so
far? I’m not sure, but you can choose to pay any price that you want.
• Why are you doing this? We are interested to see how much people will pay for a
cupcake.
• Is this tied to a marketing promotion? What strings are attached? No, there are
no strings attached.
• Where does the money you make go? The money is used to cover the costs of the
cupcakes. That’s all I’ve been told.
• Why are you offering cupcakes? Because these cupcakes are delicious and we’d
like to share them with you.
• Do you make these cupcakes yourself? No, they are made by Sugar and Scribe
Bakery. They are located in Pacific Beach.
• Do you work at Sugar and Scribe Bakery? I do not. I’m just here on the Farmer’s
Market.
• Why do you offer two kinds of cupcakes? (JOINT) So that you can choose the one
you prefer.
• Can I buy more than one cupcake? No, we have a limit of one cupcake per person,
sorry.
• Is this your own business? / Is this a commercial business? The money we make
goes to covering the costs of the cupcake. Our goal is to sell cupcakes under
Pay-What-You-Want at various Farmer’s Markets across San Diego.
• What kind of cupcake is it? It’s a chocolate cupcake with golden sprinkles. They
come in a box, so it is easy for you to take home.
• Do you offer any other flavours/sizes of cupcakes? No, at the moment we only
offer these cupcakes.
• Are the cupcakes organic / suitable for vegeterians / suitable for vegans? No,
they are made with non-certified organic ingredients / Yes, they are suitable for
vegetarians / No, they contain egg.
• What does Fair Trade mean? Fair Trade is about decent working conditions, local
sustainability and fair terms of trade for farmers and workers in the developing
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world who produce the chocolate. The organization Fair Trade International cer-
tifies products that meet the Fair Trade standards and these products receive the
Fair Trade mark. It’s an indication to the consumer that the product meets certain
social, economic and environmental requirements [Can hand out an information
sheet about the Fair Trade label].
• What is Fair Trade about the cupcake? The chocolate used to make the cupcake
is Fair Trade certified.
• Can I try a sample? Unfortunately we do not offer samples at this time, sorry.
• How much is the cupcake worth? I don’t know.
• Why are you selling these cupcakes under Pay-What-You-Want? It’s a good prod-
uct. We simply decided to allow people to decide how much they want to pay for
it.
• Are you also at other Farmer’s Markets? Yes, we are in Pacific Beach on Tuesday,
North Park on Thursday and La Jolla and Hillcrest on Sunday, for at least two
weeks.
• Why are the (Fair Trade) chocolate ones not available? I don’t really know, I just
know we don’t have them today, sorry.
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D.5 Additional regression results
Table D.5: OLS regression: Drivers of the amount paid
Dependent variable: Purchase rate (%)
Model 1 Model 2a Model 2b
Separate - Regular -1.156 ∗∗ -1.156 -1.117
[.545] [.927] [.903]
Joint -1.748 ∗∗∗ -1.748 ∗∗ -1.694 ∗∗
[.546] [.688] [.731]
Pacific Beach -.461 -.461 -.588
[.552] [.666] [.669]
La Jolla -2.280 ∗∗∗ -2.280 ∗∗ -2.329 ∗∗
[.571] [.750] [.774]
Hillcrest -2.057 ∗∗∗ -2.057 ∗∗ -1.923 ∗∗
[.588] [.706] [.744]




Constant 4.731 ∗∗∗ 4.731 ∗∗∗ 6.691 ∗∗∗
[.620] [1.108] [.940]
N 90 90 90
Adjusted R2 .325 .370 .370
Standard errors are shown in square brackets. Models 2a and 2b use robust standard errors for
time blocks. The ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significant effects at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable description: Separate regular / Joint: dummy for the respective treatment; Pacific Beach
/ La Jolla / Hillcrest: dummy for the respective market; Average temperature: Average daytime
temperature; Before/After lunch: Dummy with value 1 for purchase rates recorded after lunch, 0
otherwise.
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Table D.6: OLS regression: Drivers of the amount paid
Dependent variable: Amount paid
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Separate - Fair Trade .084 .0783 .230 .396
[.243] [.257] [.321] [.438]
Joint - Regular -1.093 ∗∗∗ -1.075 ∗∗∗ -1.105 ∗∗∗ -1.274 ∗∗∗
[.224] [.224] [.328] [.394]
Joint - Fair Trade .343 .348 .441 .337
[.226] [.230] [.269] [.342]
Pacific Beach .165 -.359 -.721
[.252] [.388] [.731]
La Jolla .081 -.381 -.475
[.239] [.356] [.460]
University Heights .333 -.210 -.030
[.651] [.754] [.928]
Hillcrest .244 -.306 -.155
[.323] [.408] [.643]




Age category .662 ∗∗ .598
[.310] [.388]






Research assistant 2 .060
[.923]
Research assistant 3 -.437
[.681]
Research assistant 4 -.013
[1.100]
Research assistant 5 -.778
[.850]
Constant 2.226 ∗∗∗ 2.042 ∗∗∗ 2.628 ∗∗∗
[.214] [.626] [.837]
N 219 219 177 141
R2 .057 .061 .105 .139
All models have robust standard errors for independent purchases and are shown in square brackets.
The ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significant effects at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Models 3
and 4 exclude observations where the customer could not be classified according to one or all of the
demographic variables included in the model. Variable description: Separate - Fair Trade / Joint
- Regular / Joint - Fair Trade: dummy for the respective treatment; Pacific Beach / La Jolla /
University Heights / Hillcrest: dummy for the respective market; Market session: the occassion
number that our stand operated at the market; Gender: the gender of the customer; Age category /
Age category2: an ordinal variable of age at 10 year intervals. Higher numbers indicate higher age;
Ethnic majority: dummy with a value of 1 if the customer is Caucasian and 0 otherwise; Research
assistant 2-5: dummy for the research assistant(s) operating the stand.
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